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Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation
I. INTRODUCTION
The Superfund program is perhaps environmental law's best Ror-
schach test, in which those who write about the national effort to clean up
contaminated sites disclose as much about their own philosophies of justice,
democracy, and economic efficiency as about environmental legislation.
The ten books reviewed here show deep conflicts among these values. I ar-
gue, based on these disparate judgments, that mdny of the Superfund de-
bates have an almost religious character. The law has been shaped to fit the
view that demonic polluters were, and remain, at work. The law also re-
flects a sense of higher duty to future generations-the unborn users of the
nation's aquifers, who I call the "angels" of Superfund.
Most experts believe that hazardous waste sites typically pose very low
risks to the public, that spending billions of dollars to clean them up is a
gross misallocation of resources, and that it is unjust to assess the costs
against companies that behaved lawfully when disposing of their wastes
long ago. In contrast, most members of the electorate believe, often with
great passion, that these sites are imminent hazards that should be cleaned
up at any cost by the wicked people who dumped there. In considering and
attempting to synthesize ten books that cover the full range of these senti-
ments, this Essay aims to point the way to a reconciliation of their seem-
ingly irreconcilable viewpoints.
In Part II, I discuss the origins and consequences of the demonology
underlying Superfund. I show that the statute was premised on the idea of
the evil polluter, and that this premise had deeply negative results. In Part
II, I also summarize and assess several proposals from these books for ex-
orcising the demonology. In Part III, I turn to the angels of Superfund in
order to show how their images dominate the program, causing us to sacri-
fice both the present and the future for them. In Part IV, I conclude with a
set of proposed principles that attempt to harmonize the values of justice,
efficiency, and democracy in hazardous waste regulation, as well as a
sketch of a legal scheme embodying those principles.
II. THE DEMONS OF THE PAST
A. Superfund Is Premised on the Idea of the Evil Polluter
During the Nixon and Ford presidencies, when Congress first enacted
most of today's federal environmental statutes, experts recognized poison-
ous chemicals as a serious problem. The year 1976 saw the enactment of
both the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),1 which requires testing of
new chemicals before they can be introduced into the market, and, ten days
later, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),2 which gov-
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1994).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1994).
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ers the treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste. However,
there was little major public outcry over these substances. A 1973 poll
showed that most people would not mind living near a hazardous waste dis-
posal facility.3
All this changed in 1978 with the publicity surrounding Love Canal, a
neighborhood in Niagara Falls, New York, that, it turned out, was built atop
an old chemical dump. Charges that the residents were becoming sick and
dying from the chemicals quickly dominated the television news and pro-
pelled the issue of abandoned waste sites to the top of the political agenda.
As Charles E. Davis demonstrates in The Politics of Hazardous Waste, the
intense press coverage (with some help from the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA))' led to a flurry of congressional activity and to the
enactment, in the last days of the Carter presidency, of the Superfund law,
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA).
Controversy remains among scientists about whether Love Canal
caused serious health effects in many people-or, actually, in anyone.6
However, in the words of Daniel Mazmanian and David Morell in Beyond
Superfailure: America 's Toxics Policy for the 1990s:
Love Canal was one of those rare catalytic events, one of those seemingly iso-
lated incidents that so often throws an entire nation into turmoil. This unpre-
dictable turning point in the late 1970s bared both the sensitive chemophobic
nerve lurking just below the surface of American public consciousness and the
growing lack of trust in both business and government expertise.
7
Love Canal sparked a broader movement, which Andrew Szasz, in
EcoPopulism: Toxic Waste and the Movement for Environmental Justice,
calls "radical environmental populism. '8  "The movement," he writes,
"brought a whole new mass base of working people and people of color to
environmentalism. It forged practical and conceptual links between envi-
3 ANDREW SZAsz, EcoPOPULIsM: TOXIC WASTE AND THE MOVEMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE 13-14 (1994).
4 EPA's role in this controversy is also described in MARC K. LANDY ET AL, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 133-71 (expanded ed. 1994).
S See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994); see also CHARLES E. DAVIS, THE POLITICS OF HAZARDOUS
WASTE 39-40 (1993).
6 AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT Is IT TRUE? A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND
SAFETY ISSUES 126-52 (1995); Gerald B. Silverman, Love Canal: A Retrospective, 20 Env't Rep.
(BNA), Sept. 15, 1989, at 835. As this Essay is written, new studies are underway to try to resolve this
controversy. See Pat Phibbs, N.Y. State Begins 5-Year Love Canal Health Study That Includes Noncan-
cer Effects, 31 ENV. SCI. TECH. 81A (1997).
7 DANIEL MAZMANIAN & DAVID MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE: AMERICA'S TOXICS POLICY
FOR THE 1990S, at 6 (1992).
8 SZASZ, supra note 3, at 6.
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ronmentalism and the struggles against racism and sexism." 9 Concern over
toxics was so great that the only major environmental laws to be enacted
during the entire anti-environmentalist Reagan presidency were strength-
ening amendments to RCRA in 1984 and to CERCLA in 1986, together
with another related law, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act, passed in 1986 in reaction to the Bhopal disaster in India.'
Both the RCRA and CERCLA amendments contained extremely detailed,
prescriptive commands for EPA, imposed by a pro-environmental (or at
least anti-toxics) Congress that was deeply distrustful of EPA in the wake
of scandals at the agency in the early years of the Reagan administration."
When the pendulum seemed to swing the other way in the 1994 elections,
the 104th Congress saw vigorous efforts, under the leadership of House
Speaker Newt Gingrich, to weaken RCRA and CERCLA, but these crum-
bled in the face of overwhelming public opposition.
12
The linkages identified by Szasz are confirmed by Richard Moore and
Louis Head in one of the essays in Unequal Protection: Environmental
Justice and Communities of Color, edited by Robert Bullard. Moore and
Head "do not single out the environment as necessarily having a special
place above all other issues; rather, [they] recognize that issues of toxic
contamination fit within an agenda that can-and, indeed, in practical, day-
to-day work does-include employment, education, housing, health care,
and other issues of social, racial, and economic justice. 13
The outcry over environmental justice (or the less neutral term envi-
ronmental racism) is the most important political development in environ-
mentalism in the 1990s. In his preface to Bullard's collection, one of the
leaders in this movement, Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., then the Executive Di-
rector of the NAACP, declared that "[e]nvironmental racism is racial dis-
crimination in environmental policy-making and enforcement of regulations
and laws, the deliberate targeting of communities of color for toxic waste
facilities, and the official sanctioning of the presence of life-threatening
9 Id. at 6. Robert Gottlieb has described how many of these issues of chemical exposure had long
been a focus of what became the women's occupational health movement, which tended to converge
with the anti-toxics movement. ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 218-27 (1993).
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1050 (1994).
11 See THOMAS W. CHURCH & ROBERT T. NAKAMURA, CLEANING UP THE MESS: IMPLEMENTATION
STRATEGIES IN SUPERFuND 9-10 (1993) (describing events that led to the forced resignation of Ann Bur-
ford, EPA Administrator, during the first two years of Reagan Administration); CHRISTOPHER HARRIS
ET AL., HAZARDOUS WASTE: CONFRONTING THE CHALLENGE 25-40 (1987); JOHN A. HIRD,
SUPERFUND: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 201 (1994).
12 For an analysis of the failed proposals in the 104th Congress to impose complicated risk assess-
ment requirements on EPA, see Jay Michaelson, Note, Rethinking Regulatory Reform: Toxics, Politics,
and Ethics, 105 YALE L.J. 1891, 1907-11 (1996).
13 Richard Moore & Louis Head, Building a Net That Works: SWOP, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION:
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 191 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994).
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poisons and pollutants in communities of color, and the history of excluding
people of color from leadership in the environmental movement.'
14
Another essay in the same collection declares quite starkly a common
view in the environmental justice movement. Regina Austin and Michael
Schill write that people of color feel that "[h]arm to the environment caused
by industrial development is not really their responsibility because they
have relatively little economic power or control over the exploitation of
natural resources. Since rich white people messed it up, rich white people
ought to clean it up.,
15
The locus of responsibility is also addressed by Yale sociology profes-
sor Kai Erikson in A New Species of Trouble: Explorations in Disaster,
Trauma, and Community, a series of case studies of communities that have
suffered from disasters, mostly toxic or nuclear. In his account of an oil
spill in Colorado, he writes:
[P]eople who are victimized by such events feel a special measure of distress
when they come to think that their affliction was caused by other human be-
ings. And that sense of injury becomes all the sharper and more damaging
when those other human beings respond to the crisis with what is seen as indif-
ference or denial. One of the clearest findings to emerge from the data now
available on the people of East Swallow is that everyone-and this time I
really mean everyone-shares the view, whatever else may be said about the
matter, that the oil companies have acted irresponsibly if not cruelly both at the
time of the gas spill and since.
16
Of all writers on toxic substances, Erikson is perhaps the most eloquent
and incisive on the subject of why people care so deeply about such sub-
stances:
[Toxins] contaminate rather than merely damage; they pollute, befoul, and
taint rather than just create wreckage; they penetrate human tissue indirectly
rather than wound the surfaces by assaults of a more straightforward kind. And
the evidence is growing that they scare human beings in new and special ways,
that they elicit an uncanny fear in us. One of the surest findings to emerge from
the new field of risk assessment is that people in general find radiation and
other toxic substances a good deal more threatening than natural hazards of
virtually any kind and technological hazards of considerable danger that do not
. 17
involve toxicity.
14 Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., Preface to UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 13, at xi-xii.
15 Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Red, and Poisoned, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION,
supra note 13, at 58, 58-59.
16 KAI ERIKSON, A NEW SPECIES OF TROUBLE: EXPLORATIONS IN DISASTER, TRAUMA, AND
COMMUNITY 129 (1994).
17 Id. at 144. For a related explanation of the depth of these feelings, see WILLIAM IAN MILLER,
THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST 106-07 (1997).
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As these works show, toxic substances are not regulated in an atmos-
phere of dispassionate policy analysis. They have an aura of unspeakable
danger caused by sinister human action. As one congressman said on the
floor of the House during the 1980 debate over Superfund,
Throughout the United States, groundwater is being grossly contaminated
by careless, uncontrolled dumping of hazardous wastes produced by a large
number of industries.... With few exceptions, the chemical industry as a
whole has been guilty of a callous disregard for the health and very lives of
citizens into whose ground water supplies they have dumped all manner of
noxious substances.
Another member during the same debate observed, "The presence of
hazardous chemicals, literally in the backyards of thousands, if not millions
of American homes, has evoked a growing national fear for the well-being
of our families."' 9 It is within that atmosphere of dread that both the regu-
lators and the regulated must operate. 0
Ironically, the image of the evil polluter may not apply at Love Canal
itself. The State of New York sought punitive damages against Hooker
Chemicals & Plastics Corp., the company that owned and operated Love
Canal. After an eight-month trial, the U.S. District Court in Buffalo found
that, during the operation of Love Canal, "Hooker comported with and of-
ten exceeded the standards demanded by statute, proposed by health and
other government officials, or followed by others in the industry."2' The
court found that Hooker had been negligent in several respects but did not
act recklessly or in wanton disregard for human welfare. Hence the court
did not award punitive 
damages.
2  
Was it an anomaly that CERCLA stemmed from public repugnance at
a company that may not have been worse than the rest in its industry? An
analysis by Bradley C. Bobertz suggests not. "A routine pattern in envi-
is See 126 CONG. REC. H9168 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Ambro); cf 126 CONG.
REC. H9158 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (testimony of representative of Chemical Manufacturers Asso-
ciation) (observing that "a thread which weaves its way through [the proposed Superfund legislation] is
that the chemical industry is evil, that it needs to be punished for the sins of the past, that it does not care
about its workers or the citizens of this country").
19 See 126 CONG. REC. H9165 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Biaggi).
20 Peter Sandman expresses a similar view:
American society has decided over the last two decades that pollution isn't just harmful-it's evil.
But talking about cost-benefit trade-offs sounds very callous when the risk is morally relevant.
Imagine a police chief insisting that an occasional child-molester is an 'acceptable risk.'
Peter M. Sandman, Risk Communication: Facing Public Outrage, 13 EPA J. 21, 22 (1987). For another
example of the view of the evil corporate polluter, see Russell Mokhiber, Viewpoint: Don't Hinder Pol-
lution Police, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1995, at Al1.
21 See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 850 F. Supp. 993, 1057-58 (W.D.N.Y.
1994).
22 Id. at 1067-69.
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ronmental lawmaking," he asserts, "is a tendency to blame problems on
easily identifiable objects and entities rather than on the social and eco-
nomic practices that produce them." 23 Bobertz then argues that "[o]nce
identified as the culprit of an environmental problem, this blame-holder
comes to symbolize and embody the problem."2 F He continues as follows:
At the time of [CERCLA's] enactment, the problem of toxic waste dumps
was viewed as the malfeasance of a few reckless companies, like Hooker
Chemical Company at Love Canal. Blame centered on the image of sinister
corporations who left toxic messes for others to clean up. Congress passed the
law with the optimistic belief that wrongdoers were relatively few in number,
that they could be easily identified and made to pay, and that a modest federal
fund would be adequate to fill in any gaps in cleanup costs.
25
The search for culprits is not unique to environmental law. Indeed,
cultural anthropologist Mary Douglas has shown that societies are marked
by their "blaming systems"-their tendencies to attribute some or all prob-
lems to particular evils.26 A few peoples, such as the Sherpas of Nepal,
have "no-fault cultures"-they seldom blame anyone for anything. Others
find a moral lesson in every earthquake or storm:
Of the different types of blaming system that we can find in tribal society,
the one we are in now is almost ready to treat every death as chargeable to
someone's account, every accident as caused by someone's criminal negli-
gence, every sickness a threatened prosecution. Whose fault? is the first ques-
tion. Then, what action? Which means, what damages? what compensation?
what restitution? and the preventive action is to improve the coding of risk in
the domain which has turned out to be inadequately covered. Under the banner
of risk reduction, a new blaming system has replaced the former combination
of moralistic condemning the victim and opportunistic condemning the vic-
tim's incompetence. This approximates remarkably well to the situation among
so-called primitives where the idea of a natural death is hardly entertained.
27
The blaming system underlying CERCLA has allowed us to visualize
the genesis of hazardous waste sites in the actions of a few evil corporations
that can be punished and purged, rather than as an inherent product of in-
dustrial production.2 8 This image was made more vivid by the insensitive
and arrogant responses of some of the involved companies, and by media
2 Bradley C. Bobertz, Transfening the Blame, 13 ENVTL. F., Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 22, 22-23.
SId.
25 Id. at 27.
26 MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY 15-16 (1992).
27 Id.
28 See BRIAN WYNNE, RISK MANAGEMENT AND HAZARDOUS WASTE: IMPLEMENTATION AND THE
DIALECTICS OF CREDIBILITY 365, 373 (1987).
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exposes of particular incidents. As it turned out, however, the CERCLA li-
ability web snared nearly every industrial company in the country, as well
as thousands of innocent-looking entities. When it came to hazardous
waste generation, everyone was doing it, and it all had to go somewhere.
When the "somewhere" was found to be leaking, these companies were
caught and, because neither legality nor ignorance was an excuse, they paid.
Liability became the rule rather than the exception.
The notion that correcting the consequences of a nearly universal ac-
tivity should be the financial burden of countless discrete companies, dis-
tributed through litigation, rather than of society, funded by a broad-based
tax,29 is sustained by the invisibility of the fruits of hazardous waste. Each
of us knows that we personally generate ordinary kinds of waste, which we
dispose of through garbage cans, sewer pipes, and auto tail pipes. But we
know little of how our consumption patterns involve the remote creation of
hazardous waste. The chemical plant that generated the wastes that went to
Love Canal manufactured various pesticides, including lindane and trichlo-
rophenol, which are used to control insects in seeds, livestock, logs, and
trees.3 Over the years millions of people went to supermarkets and bought
food that was produced using chemicals from this Hooker plant, but, except
for some Hooker employees and customers, virtually none had, or still has,
any notion that their consumption was contributing to the contamination of
Love Canal.
Products are not labeled to disclose the hazardous waste generated in
their manufacture, so consumers (except when buying such obvious items
as paint thinner) have no idea of the effects of their purchases. They also
have no control at all over the mode of manufacture. Reducing hazardous
waste generation is an appropriate job for a federal law, but, as noted below,
no such law has any real teeth. The Congresses of the 1990s have been
disinclined to creating new regulatory programs, consumer groups have not
advocated measures that could raise product prices, and specific efforts to
reduce hazardous waste generation have not risen high on the agenda of
most environmental groups. Meanwhile, the image that hazardous waste
resulted from and benefited a few bad actors predominates, and the
CERCLA liability scheme follows naturally.
B. Consequences of the Premise
This image of the evil polluter has had broad consequences. In enact-
ing CERCLA, Congress sought to clean up as many sites as possible with
as little federal money as possible, in keeping with the tradition of imposing
29 For a discussion of this issue in a different context, see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 6-7 (1970).
30 See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 850 F. Supp. 993, 1013-15 (W.D.N.Y.
1994).
31 See U.S. Dropping Effort to Ban Uses of Lindane, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1983, at A21.
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ever-increasing tasks on EPA while withholding the federal funds necessary
to carry them out.32 Despite the image implied by its name, the "Superfund"
is not a grant program; it is a federal account that pays certain costs. The
EPA then seeks reimbursement whenever it can. In the Supreme Court's
words, "The remedy that Congress felt it needed in CERCLA is sweeping:
everyone who is potentially responsible for hazardous-waste contamination
may be forced to contribute to the costs of cleanup. 33 CERCLA lists four
classes of persons who may be liable: the owner and operator of a facility;
any person who owned or operated a facility at the time any hazardous sub-
stances were disposed there; those who arranged for disposal or transport of
such substances (including those who generated the substances); and those
who transported them.
34
Though the statute is silent on the matter, the courts have held that
CERCLA imposes liability that is retroactive,35 strict,36 and joint and sev-
eral.37 Thus a company that, decades earlier, legally sent hazardous waste
to a lawfully operating landfill could, today, be required to pay the entire
cost of cleaning up the landfill. Even if there are others to share the ex-
pense, the legal fees can be prohibitive, especially for small entities. In one
celebrated case, pizzerias, an exercise gym, the Elks Club, and others-603
in all-were sued for legally sending waste to a landfill.38 In another, more
than 200 waste generators were required to pay a share of the cost of
cleaning the Stringfellow Acid Pits in California even though the state had
mandated that they use the facility.39 CERCLA is a system of waste liabil-
ity "unique among the advanced industrialized nations of the world.' 40 Its
legislative history makes clear that a party's good or bad behavior can affect
32 See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental
Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311,328-30 (1991).
33 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989) (emphasis added), overruled on other
grounds by Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
34 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
35 See United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Waste Indus.,
Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984).
36 See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); but see New York v.
Lashins Arcade Co., 91 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1996) (allowing current site owner to escape strict liability
through use of third-party defense).
37 See United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1084 (1991); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1106 (1989). Some recent decisions have broadened the opportunities for parties to escape joint and
several liability by establishing that the harm caused by their wastes was divisible. See, e-g., United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993).
38 See Robert Tomsho, Pollution Ploy: Big Corporations Hit by Superfund Cases Find Way to Share
Bill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1991, at Al.
39 MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 7, at 34-35.
40 CHURCH & NAKAMURA, supra note 11, at 168. Indeed, it has been remarked that the 1986
amendments to CERCLA, called SARA (Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act), would
more properly have been called RACHEL (Reauthorization Act Clarifying How Everyone's Liable).
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how much it pays relative to other liable entities,41 but not whether it is li-
able.
This broad net of liability has been accompanied by a linguistic trans-
formation. "Potentially responsible party" or "PRP" has become a
CERCLA term of art for anyone who might be within this net; there are
PRP committees, PRP meetings and PRP agreements. But the term "PRP"
also sounds like police shorthand for "perpetrator" and has frequently been
used interchangeably with "polluter."42 "Polluter" is a word of opprobrium,
and the concept that the "polluter pays" is common to much environmental
regulation.43 But if every PRP is, by definition, a polluter, then even the
morally blameless individual or company is subjected to harsh treatment.
Just as for years there has been a blurring of the line between conduct that is
criminal and that which is merely tortious, 44 CERCLA has elided the
boundary between evil conduct and strict liability. The books reviewed
here, and other sources, explore many of the consequences of this demoni-
zation of the PRP.
1. Counterproductive prosecutions.-The way that EPA and its law-
yers at the Department of Justice treat PRPs is a major subject of Cleaning
Up the Mess: Implementation Strategies in Superfund by Thomas W.
Church and Robert T. Nakamura. Political scientists at the State University
of New York at Albany, Church and Nakamura reviewed the methods used
by several regional offices of EPA in enforcing CERCLA and identified
three overall approaches, which they call "prosecution, .... accommodation,"
and "public works. 45 In the prosecution approach, EPA pursues the PRPs
without mercy; in the accommodation approach, EPA works cooperatively
with the PRPs; and in the public works approach, EPA uses Superfund
money to clean up sites itself and then goes after the PRPs for reimburse-
ment. As Church and Nakamura describe it,
The central tenet of the prosecution approach is that the selected PRPs can and
must be made fully responsible for all cleanup costs. This is both the govern-
41 See Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1995) (discussing the "Gore fac-
tors," named after Al Gore, for allocating liability among PRPs).
42 See, e.g., United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chems., 41 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1417 (E.D. Pa.
1995); Michele McAminch Miller, Defense Department Pursuit of Insurers for Superfiund Cost Recov-
ery, 138 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1992); Ian G. John, Note, Too Much Waste: A Proposal for Change in the
Governmental Efforts to Clean Up the Nation, 70 IND. L.J. 951,952 (1995).
43 CHURCH & NAKAMURA, supra note 11, at 20.
44 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawfil" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991). For examples of the criminaliza-
tion of what previously might have been seen as mere environmental regulatory violations, see United
States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 773 (1996); United States v.
Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994).
45 SeeCHURCH&NAKAMUJRA, supranote 11, at 10-12.
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ment's negotiating position and what frequently appears to be a moral impera-
tive. In this approach, the government plays an uncompromising role analo-
gous to that assumed by prosecutors dealing with especially blameworthy
criminal defendants. Strict, joint and several liability in this context dictates
that any deviation from assumption by the PRPs of all the costs and risks asso-
ciated with cleanups constitutes an unwarranted, if not improper, concession to
parties who have no legitimate right to escape the full implications of their le-
gal position.
46
Continuing this theme, the authors report the following:
Proponents of the prosecution approach in particular often suggest that
Superfund provides a means to punish those individuals and businesses that
have despoiled the environment, independent of a concern with site-specific
cleanup activities. This punishment-oriented approach to Superfund explains
some of the actions and attitudes of EPA and Justice Department officials. It is
a major component of the position toward Superfund advocated by vocal seg-
ments of the environmental community.47
Church and Nakamura found "that a harsh enforcement regime pro-
duces high transaction costs and an unproductive, acrimonious relationship
between business and government ... [and an atmosphere of] 'adversarial
legalism."' 48 After reviewing all the EPA approaches, they express their
"judgment that a government strategy to give no quarter, to apply the
broadest conception of joint and several liability so as to place the entire
cleanup burden on the PRPs, is unlikely to meet with success. Indeed, our
cases suggest that it may well be counterproductive."49 Treating PRPs as
demons impedes rather than advances cleanups.
Likewise, Lewis A. Komhauser and Richard L. Revesz, writing in
Analyzing Superfund: Economics, Science, and Law, a book of conference
proceedings edited by Revesz and Richard B. Stewart, have constructed an
economic model that finds no advantage of strict liability over nonjoint li-
ability in deterring contamination or inducing parties to settle. 0
2. Distorted cost/benefit analysis.-A central question in evaluating
many government programs is whether their benefits exceed their costs.
Yet under CERCLA, as Church and Nakamura remind us, where
46 Id.
47 Id. at 38 (citation omitted).
48 Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
49 See id. at 137.
50 ANALYZING SUPERFUND: EcoNoMIcs, SCIENCE, AND LAW 115 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B.
Stewart eds., 1995).
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the unambiguous standard of strict, joint and several liability makes any viable
PRP liable for all costs associated with site cleanup, no matter how minimally
involved, EPA and Justice Department officials will have a clear and direct in-
centive-if not, as in the prosecution approach, a moral imperative-to impose
theoretically unlimited costs on such parties, regardless of the dictates of eq-
uity or proportionality.
51
Thus the government, with its ability to shift costs from public to pri-
vate sources, cares little about how much a given policy objective is worth.
Instead, in the words of Church and Nakamura, "[t]he locus of these deci-
sions shifts from how much of a given good we can afford, to how much it
will cost government in both economic and political terms to impose these
costs on private parties.' 52 Therefore, a second consequence of the demoni-
zation of the PRP is truncated cost/benefit analysis justifying unduly elabo-
rate cleanups.
3. Transaction costs.-When EPA sends out notices informing com-
panies that they have become PRPs (letters that are about as welcome as
draft notices once were) at least two flurries of activity usually result. The
first is that similarly situated PRPs come together to try to form PRP groups
to handle joint activities, such as remedial investigations and other studies;
suits against third-party defendants; negotiations with EPA; and, ultimately,
cleanup. The second is that the PRPs notify their insurers, which typically
disclaim coverage, in turn triggering litigation.
All this provides a feast for lawyers and consultants. One can almost
envision a neighborhood of affluent professionals with a sign at the gate,
"Transaction Costs Estates." One way or the other, EPA imposes virtually
all CERCLA costs on PRPs; either EPA performs the work and then
charges the PRPs for it, or the PRPs do the work themselves. A RAND
Corporation study, reported in the Revesz and Stewart collection, found that
transaction costs represented roughly one-third of total private sector PRP
expenditures.53 The costs are, unsurprisingly, higher at sites with large
numbers of PRPs. Furthermore, as Church and Nakamura found, "EPA of-
ficials evince little concern over the transaction costs of the PRPs. These
costs are seen as self-inflicted wounds: instead of being inappropriately
contentious and recalcitrant, PRPs should simply yield to the government's
superior legal position." 4
51 CHURCH & NAKAMURA, supra note 11, at 161 (citations omitted).
52 Id. at 163.
53 Lloyd S. Dixon, The Transaction Costs Generated by Superfund's Liability Approach, in
ANALYZING SUPERFUND, supra note 50, at 175.
54 CHURCH & NAKAMURA, supra note 11, at 133.
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4. Impeded technological development.-One unanticipated effect of
the CERCLA liability scheme has been to inhibit the development of new
technologies for treating hazardous wastes. Advanced new technologies are
called for by both SARA55 and RCRA. * However, as Mazmanian and Mo-
rell observe, under CERCLA "the only way to remain clear of responsibil-
ity for any harm (or alleged harm) resulting anywhere along the life path of
a hazardous waste was to avoid it entirely. Inevitably, this policy discour-
aged private development of a marketplace in hazardous waste treatment.",1
7
Even the large industrial companies with the capital and the expertise to de-
velop new technologies felt the impact of CERCLA:
[These companies] were frightened by CERCLA's apparently infinite reach
into their deep pockets. Despite their immense technical competence and their
access to capital to build the needed new treatment facilities, the willingness of
these corporations to lead America out of its hazardous waste management
wilderness was diluted by the chilling effect of the liability rules crafted to deal
with remediation at Superfund sites.
The large national waste management companies did not have the
same concerns, since they were already very much in the liability soup and
had learned to live with it, but success with new treatment technologies
could have cut into their core businesses-hazardous waste landfills and in-
cinerators-and so interested few such companies.
5 9
Though CERCLA has a limited liability exemption for companies that
provide emergency response to spills, 60 it has no such exemption for firms
that develop new waste treatment or reduction technologies. CERCLA also
provides that EPA-authorized cleanups are exempt from state and local
permit requirements, 61 but there is no such permit exemption for new treat-
ment facilities not tied to a specific Superfund site.62 As a result of the
CERCLA liability scheme and other factors, "America's failure to adopt
available technologies is in stark contrast to the success many other ad-
55 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1994).
56 42 U.S.C. § 6924(g) (1994).
57 See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 7, at 12.
58 Id. at 107. For a contrasting view from the environmental community, see Rena I. Steinzor &
Linda E. Greer, In Defense of the Supefund Liability System: Matching the Diagnosis and the Cure, 27
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,286, 10,290 (1997) (arguing that joint and several strict liability gives large PRPs
incentives to develop innovative treatment technologies that will reduce their cleanup cost exposure).
59 MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 7, at 107.
60 42 U.S.C. § 9619(c) (1994).
61 Id. § 9621(e)(1).
62 For a discussion of the permit requirements applicable to new hazardous waste treatment facili-
ties, see MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN ToXIc AND
NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 56-66 (1994).
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vanced industrial nations have had introducing new techniques of waste
management and source reduction. 63
5. Inhibited disposal facility construction and waste generation.-Not
all consequences of the liability scheme have been negative. Corporate fear
of CERCLA liability, coupled with the public concerns described by Kai
Erikson-that toxics are so nefarious and uncontainable that all proximity
to them should be shunned-have inhibited the construction of new dis-
posal facilities for hazardous waste, such as landfills and incinerators. In
fact, no commercial hazardous waste landfill has been sited in a new loca-
tion in the United States since 1976, when a new landfill was built in the
prophetically named Last Chance, Colorado.64
Failure to site facilities collided with a policy underlying RCRA-that
all hazardous waste, if it could not be reused or recycled, should be dis-
posed of in state-of-the-art facilities. As a result of political compromises
surrounding its enactment, RCRA, in stark contrast to laws such as the
Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, contains no meaningful restrictions
on the generation of waste;65 nor do any other federal statutes directly re-
strict hazardous waste production, despite the existence of numerous op-
tions for doing so. 6 6  Stricter controls over hazardous waste disposal,
resulting from enforcement of RCRA, and the greater need for disposal of
cleanup wastes, stemming from CERCLA, added greatly to the demand for
disposal facilities. Since the supply of such facilities did not rise, the in-
evitable first-order effect was a dramatic increase in disposal prices.67
Second-order effects soon followed, however. Because disposal cost
much more, large companies had great incentive to find ways to avoid this
cost, such as by generating less waste. Even greater incentive for waste re-
duction resulted from CERCLA's liability scheme; because waste genera-
tors faced endless liability for even lawful disposal, companies tried to
generate as little as they could.
By the mid-1990s, the third-order effects were being felt. Demand for
hazardous waste disposal dropped again, caused by a combination of
CERCLA liability concerns, RCRA operational requirements, high disposal
prices, and a weak industrial economy in some regions. This led to a virtual
63 See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 7, at 117; see also AMERICA'S FUTURE IN Toxic
WASTE MANAGEMENT (Bruce W. Piasecki & Gary A. Davis eds., 1987).
64 See GERRARD, supra note 62, at 1.
65 See SZASZ, supra note 3, at 17-21.
66 See Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste
Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1047, 1167-73 (1994).
67 See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 7, at 128-29; D. Kofi Asante-Duah et al., The Hazard-
ous Waste Trade: Can It Be Controlled?, 26 ENVTL. SCi. & TECH. 1684, 1685 (1992); Hsin-Neng Hsieh
& Haydar Erdogan, Cost Estimates for Several Hazardous Waste Disposal Options, 5 HAzARDOuS
WASTE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 329, 333-35 (1988).
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depression in the hazardous waste disposal industry and to the cancellation
of most of the plans to build new hazardous waste incinerators.68
This decline in the creation of hazardous waste is a hapgy develop-
ment. Andrew Szasz gives credit to the anti-toxics movement. To the ex-
tent that this movement reinforced EPA's backbone in enforcing RCRA and
CERCLA, contributed to the strengthening of these laws in 1984 and 1986
and to their preservation in 1995 and 1996, and made it virtually impossible
to site new disposal facilities, at least partial credit seems well placed.
6. Focus on wastes, not products.-Each of the different toxics stat-
utes covers a different universe of chemicals. The definitional issues them-
selves are so complicated that a two-volume treatise has been written that
explores only some of them.70 For purposes of this Essay, the situation can
be simplified by depicting these systems as three concentric circles, like a
bulls-eye. The inner circle represents "hazardous wastes" regulated by
RCRA.71 The middle ring, incorporating virtually all hazardous wastes plus
several other classes of chemicals, is "hazardous substances" regulated by
CERCLA.72 The outer circle, encompassing by far the largest collection of
chemicals, includes "hazardous materials" regulated by the Hazardous Ma-
terials Transportation Act (HMTA).73
From the standpoint of public health and probably also environmental
protection, the most important of these three laws, by far, is the HMTA-
the law that regulates the transportation (by truck, rail, ship and airplane) of
chemical products, intermediates, and wastes.74 The shipment of gasoline
to filling stations, bleach to grocery stores, and insecticides to farms, as well
as contaminated soil from Superfund sites to landfills, is all governed by the
HMTA. Indeed, hazardous wastes account for only about one percent of
HMTA-regulated shipments.75
Many lives are risked daily in activities covered by the HMTA. It may
have been an HMTA violation (the carriage of mislabeled oxygen bottles)
that caused the ValuJet crash in Florida on May 11, 1996, claiming 110
68 See Jeff Bailey, Slump at Hazardous-Waste Dumps Raises Concerns, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1994,
at B4; Donna Engelgau, Where Have All the Waste Streams Gone?, RESOURCES, Apr. 1996, at 3; Jon
Hanke, Hazwaste Landfill Operators Face Difficult imes, WORLD WASTES, Sept. 1994, at 10; Hazard-
ous Waste Stream Shrivels But Remains Biggest for Top 200, ENGINEERING NEws-RECORD, Aug. 12,
1991, at 45.
69 See SZASZ, supra note 3, at 145.
70 See generally JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG, HAZARDOUS WASTE LAW & PRACTICE (1986).
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1994).
72 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994).
73 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-27 (1994).
74 See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 7, at 145.
75 See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PUB. NO. OTA-SET-304, TRANSPORTATION
OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 35,41 (1986) [hereinafter OTA].
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lives.76 Crashes involving other HMTA-regulated substances kill more than
100 people in a typical year -more people by an order of magnitude or
two than, by all estimates, die annually as a result of RCRA- or CERCLA-
related activities. All would presumably agree that a tanker truck full of
gasoline or Clorox hurtling down an interstate highway at sixty-five miles
per hour poses a greater health and safety risk than contaminated soil buried
in a landfill.
Despite these much higher human stakes, HMTA is far less known
than RCRA and CERCLA. One reason is probably that HMTA activities
are so familiar. Every time you spend an hour driving on a highway, you
see dozens of tanker trucks bearing the familiar HIMTA-required diamond-
shaped placards. The burial of hazardous waste, in contrast, is generally an
unseen act, with sinister overtones, performed by demonized PRPs. Normal
people load and drive trucks, without the implication of danger and evil that
surrounds those who deal in hazardous wastes.
Between the two better-known laws, CERCLA inappropriately re-
ceives much more attention than RCRA. Though Congress enacted RCRA
in 1976, it was not until 1980 that the EPA issued the first major imple-
menting regulations, and only in 1984 were amendments made to energize
enforcement of those regulations. According to Mazmanian and Morell,
Even after EPA and the states did turn to RCRA-related issues in the early
1980s, effective management of new wastes remained grossly subordinate to
the more politically pressing and myopic focus on cleanup. The public was
mesmerized by the Superfund genie; so was the nascent but rapidly growing
commercial hazardous waste management industry. Regulatory agencies fol-
lowed suit. Thus, management of the larger millions of tons of hazardous
wastes continuously being produced remained almost exclusively the turf of
industry.
78
It should come as no surprise that this distortion in regulatory emphasis
is reflected in the number of lawyers practicing under each statute. The
publishers of a directory of environmental lawyers asked each one to name
his or her primary area of specialization; the results were CERCLA, about
3060; RCRA, 1110; TSCA, 40; and transportation or HMTA, 5.79 This is in
almost inverse proportion to the human threats addressed by each statute.
Even most RCRA hazardous waste escapes serious scrutiny. The prin-
cipal mechanism for tracking hazardous waste is the manifest system under
which wastes are to be followed from "cradle to grave." However, mani-
76 See James T. McKenna, Safety Board Reviews ValuJet Operations, AvIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., June 3, 1996, at 33.
77 See OTA, supra note 75, at 78.
78 MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 7, at 78.
79 See LAW AND BUSlNESS DIRECrORY OF ENvIRONMENTAL ATTORNEYS 1409-1583 (1995).
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fests are not required for wastes that are managed on-site at the facility
where they are generated.80 About ninety-six percent of all hazardous
waste, mostly wastewater, is managed on-site."1 Partly in reaction to RCRA
and CERCLA, increasing portions of waste are staying on-site, and thus
avoiding many EPA regulations.
7. Slow pace of cleanups.--One of the well-known scandals of
CERCLA is how few sites have actually been cleaned. Church and Naka-
mura report that the average time between identification of a site and the
completion of its cleanup has been eight years, with the average cost over
$30 million per site. More recent numbers suggest that the average time is
increasing and is now approaching twenty years.83 They note that there
"have been far more people in three-piece suits than moonsuits on these
projects. 84 One reason is "the culture of adversariness and bureaucratic
nitpicking that has developed under the Superfund program[, which] is a
major source of delay, expense, and mutual frustration.""
The acrimonious litigation that results in part from the demonizing of
PRPs has, as noted above, greatly protracted the decisionmaking process.86
The elaborate data validation and quality assurance/quality control mecha-
nisms that EPA requires to ensure that PRPs and their laboratories do not
falsify sampling data has only furthered this result.
Cleanups have been further inhibited by another facet of CERCLA li-
ability:
Even those few firms willing to step forward voluntarily with a "fair-share"
contribution were deterred from doing so for fear that once involved, they
would inherit the entire cleanup cost. For big business especially, Superfund
had become "the legal equivalent of a 'survivor-pays-all' game of roulette."
This led one state official to observe that "listing a site on the Superfund Na-
80 See 40 C.F.R. § 262.20(a) (1994); MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 7, at 86.
81 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY
RESPONSE, PUB. NO. 05-312, NATIONAL BIENNIAL RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT (BASED ON
1989 DATA) at 4 (1993).
82 See CHURCH & NAKAMURA, supra note 11, at 8.
83 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-97-20, SUPERFUND: TIMES TO
COMPLETE THE ASSESSMENT AND CLEANUP OF HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1997).
84 See CHURCH & NAKAMURA, supra note 11, at 38 (quoting William Reilly, EPA Administrator).
85 See E. Donald Elliott, Superfund: EPA Success, National Debacle?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Winter 1992, at 11.
86 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ANALYZING THE DURATION OF CLEANUP AT SITES ON
SUPERFUND'S NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST 2, 3 (1994) (stating that sites with enforcement and legal
problems stemming from large numbers of PRPs tended to have slower cleanups).
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tional Priorities List can actually be counterproductive in achieving cleanup of
the site."
87
I can add to this my own experience with several contaminated sites whose
owners were eager to undertake a swift cleanup, but who were prevented
from doing so for five or more years because of the red tape imposed by
EPA or state environmental agencies-red tape that partly arose from the
implicit assumption that the owners required close policing to prevent them
from misbehaving.
8. Brownfields -In the last two or three years one of the hottest topics
in hazardous waste has been brownfields-slightly contaminated properties,
usually abandoned or underutilized, whose redevelopment has been inhib-
ited by liability concerns. Because current owners of contaminated prop-
erty may be held liable to clean it up, even if they did not in any way
contribute to the contamination, and because banks that financed develop-
ment on such property may also be worried about their own liability, a
contaminated parcel (and certainly one on the federal or state Superfund
lists) could swiftly become orphaned-no one would take it, even for free.
When in the mid-1990s it became clear that many urban areas were
blighted by this phenomenon, federal and state programs began providing
relief. For example, EPA announced that it would enter into "prospective
purchaser agreements" with potential buyers who would commit to under-
take certain cleanup activities in exchange for a limited release from liabil-
ity.88 Government agencies also became more willing to relax cleanup
standards for sites that seemed destined for permanent industrial and com-
mercial use.
Important vestiges of Superfund demonology remain, however. The
liability releases granted to new site owners are seldom complete and not
available to anyone who has had any relationship with a PRP.' 9 Moreover,
in some states no PRP is eligible to benefit from a brownfields program. 90
The reason is apparently because lawmakers in these states believe that a
PRP is necessarily a guilty party who should not enjoy any government
benefits relating to pollution that he himself caused. This is so despite the
fact, as noted above, that only a fraction of PRPs meaningfully contributed
to contaminating the sites for which they are liable.
87 MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 7, at 36-37 (citations omitted). The perils when some but
not all PRPs settle with EPA are analyzed in Jerome M. Organ, Superfund and the Settlement Decision:
Reflections on the Relationship Between Equity and Efficiency, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043 (1994).
88 See 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (1995).
89 Id.
90 See, eg., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 56-0505.4, 56-0507.2 (added by 1996 N.Y. Laws ch.
413) (McKinney 1997) (requiring PRP to reimburse the state for all bond issue assistance received for
brownfields redevelopment).
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9. The averted gaze.-Another consequence of CERCLA demonology
is its effect on the assessment and supervision of properties and facilities.
The environmental auditing industry was propelled by a series of judicial
decisions in the mid-1980s that threatened to impose liability on banks that
foreclosed on contaminated properties. 91 Merely being in the chain of title
for such properties virtually guaranteed a lawsuit. The situation took a
complicated turn in 1990 with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in United States v. Fleet Factors." A two-judge panel
93
stated, in dictum, that a bank that did not foreclose on property could be
held liable to clean it up "if its involvement with the management of the fa-
cility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect haz-
ardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose. 94
This decision represented the high water mark of CERCLA liability
and of the notion that anyone who ever had anything to do with hazardous
waste should be liable for its cleanup. EPA tried to overturn it through
promulgation of a Lender Liability Rule,95 but that rule was in turn struck
down as being beyond EPA's statutory authority.96 Finally, in late 1996,
Congress legislatively overruled Fleet Factors and in effect reinstated the
Lender Liability Rule.97 This solved most of the problems experienced by
lending institutions under CERCLA, but it still left considerable uncertainty
in most other sectors.
Before the 1996 enactment, one element of this uncertainty was the
elusive capacity to control test. In order to be sure of not passing this test,
many lawyers advised their financial institution clients not to undertake
certain oversight of a property's hazardous waste activities, for fear that
such oversight could be read as exerting actual control of the activities, and
thus subjecting one to full liability for those activities. 9' A further conse-
quence of this tendency was the loss of a potentially important mechanism
(oversight by lenders) to ensure the sound management of hazardous waste.
91 See, eg., Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989); United
States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Mirabile, 15
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1511 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
92 See 901 F.2d 1550 (1 lth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
93 Between the oral argument and the decision, a third member of the panel, Judge Robert Vance,
was killed by a letter bomb. See Letter Bomb Kills U.S. Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1989, at 1.
9' See 901 F.2d at 1558.
95 See 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (amending 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 subpt. L).
96 See Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, American Bankers Ass'n v.
Kelley, 513 US 1110 (1995).
97 Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (1997)).
9s See James R. Moore et al., Why Risk Criminal Charges by Performing Environmental Audits?, 6
TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) 503 (1991).
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10. Insurance problems.-Insurance provides society with an impor-
tant way to spread risks. An insurance system depends on being able to
roughly predict the overall level of claims; otherwise there is no basis for
setting premiums. The breadth, retroactivity, and, especially, unpredict-
ability of the CERCLA liability system have all contributed to a crisis in li-
ability insurance markets.99 Many desirable activities became virtually
uninsurable, such as purchase of slightly contaminated property by compa-
nies willing to clean it up, or the development of hazardous waste treatment
technologies, 00 and thus were deterred. Unanticipated CERCLA exposure
also represented a major factor in the financial crisis enveloping Lloyd's of
London.10
11. Political opposition.-CERCLA has spawned a thousand tales of
anguish, many of them told by PRPs who have been driven to or over the
brink of bankruptcy for seemingly innocent acts. The widespread feeling of
unfairness has fueled opposition to environmental regulation in general.
CERCLA is a small player in the overall scheme of environmental rules;
annual spending in the United States pursuant to CERCLA is about $6 bil-
lion (including both federal and private expenditures), representing less
than five per cent of the $135 billion spent each year to comply with all
federal environmental regulations.102 However, its counterintuitive (and, to
many, inherently unjust) liability system, coupled with EPA's sometimes
harsh administration of the program, have spun off a disproportionate num-
ber of horror stories, some of them actually true.'03 The resulting antago-
nism came close in the 104th Congress to undermining the overall scheme
of federal environmental statutes.
In sum, the demonizing of PRPs has, on balance, had quite negative ef-
fects. I now turn to several of the authors who have proposed reforms in
this system.
99 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 942 (1988); Peter S. Menell, The Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing Environmental
Risks, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 108-09 (1991).
100 See Dennis IL Connolly, Toxics: Too Risky to Insure? Yes, No, Maybe So, 3 TOxIcs L. REP.
(BNA) 715 (1988).
101 See Dan R Anderson, Financial and Organizational Impact of Superfund-Mandated Hazardous
Waste Liabilities on the Insurance Industry, 49 CPCU J. 22 (1996).
102 See KATHERINE N. PROBST ET AL., FOOTING THE BILL FOR SUPERFUND CLEANUPS 11, 111-12
(1995).
103 For an analysis of this kind of phenomenon, though not specifically in the CERCLA context, see
Jeffrey Raechlinski, Perceptions of Fairness in Environmental Regulation, in STRATEGIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 339 (1995).
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C. Exorcising the Demonology: The Rational Analysis Model
1. Justice Breyer's proposal.-Several writers have looked for ways
to escape from the focus on apparently evil polluters and to reorient the na-
tional toxics programs. Most prominent of these is Supreme Court Justice
Stephen Breyer, a former Harvard Law School professor who was a judge
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit when he wrote Breaking
the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation.
Justice Breyer believes that a grossly disproportionate amount of re-
sources go to reducing risks that are quantitatively very small, including
those at typical CERCLA sites, while far greater risks are all but ignored.
He quotes a Fifth Circuit decision which mentioned that over the next thir-
teen years, more than a dozen deaths can be expected from the ingestion of
toothpicks, a death toll more than twice what EPA predicts will flow from
bans, costing a quarter-billion dollars, on certain asbestos products.1°4 He
cites numerous examples of what he sees as overregulation of trivial risks,
stemming mostly from public overreaction to those risks. He also observes
the following:
Study after study shows that the public's evaluation of risk problems differs
radically from any consensus of experts in the field. Risks associated with
toxic waste dumps and nuclear power appear near the bottom of most expert
lists; they appear near the top of the public's list of concerns, which more di-
rectly influences regulatory agendas.
Justice Breyer acknowledges the considerable literature on the psy-
chology of risk perception, which has shown that such factors as voluntari-
ness, suddenness, dread, and familiarity are central in shaping public views.
He even cites Kai Erikson. 10 6 Breyer, however, prefers another approach:
There is a far simpler explanation for the public's aversion to toxic waste
dumps than an enormous desire for supersafety, or a strong aversion to the ti-
niest risk of harm-namely, the public does not believe that the risks are tiny.
The public's "nonexpert" reactions reflect not different values but different
understandings about the underlying risk-related facts.1 °7
Justice Breyer goes on to assume, consistent with this explanation, that
"[t]he public wants better health and more safety overall. On balance, the
O See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION
14 (1993) (citing Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1223 n.23 (5th Cir. 1991)).
105 Id. at 33.
106 Id. at 101-02 n.2.
107 Id. at 35.
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public would like to have more risk reduction at current expenditure or
similar risk reduction at less cost, i.e., it would like more 'optimizing.' 10 8
He further proposes reducing risks through the creation of a small,
centralized administrative group within the White House that would be
"charged with a rationalizing mission"109 to target federal efforts where the
most risk reduction will be achieved per dollar spent. This elite group,
modeled after the Conseil d'Etat in France, "might, for example, look for
practical ways to settle some toxic dump cases, thereby obtaining funds that
might be used to help pay for vaccinations, or prenatal care, or mammo-
grams. 110
2. The empirical critique.-Justice Breyer's approach is congruent
with the "comparative risk assessment" process advanced by President
Bush's EPA administrator, William Reilly, and coolly received by President
Clinton's EPA administrator, Carol Browner."' This assessment grew out
of a series of reports, some prepared at Reilly's behest, that ranked
CERCLA sites, among other perils, as very low on the list of actual risks to
human health. Those reports, on which Breyer heavily relied, candidly ad-
mitted that they were not rigorous studies but merely presented the profes-
sional judgments of various EPA experts.
112
Another report whose results Justice Breyer reprints at length-indeed,
four of the seventy-three pages of text in his book are devoted to it-is a
ranking of the cost-effectiveness of fifty-three rules, measured as "cost per
premature death averted."' 1t 3 The ranking is all very impressive until you
follow the footnotes. The cited source is a paper from the Office of Man-
agement and Budget.1 4  That paper, in turn, relies on a 1986 article,"'
which says it primarily used data from regulatory impact statements pre-
pared by agencies proposing various rules. I looked up these statements for
those rules that the 1986 article ranked as being the most11 6 and the least"
7
I Id. at 55.
'09 Id. at 60.
"0 Id. at 67.
III See Daniel C. Esty, What's the Risk in Risk?, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 603 (1996).
112 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, UNFINISHED
BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS/OVERVIEW REPORT at xiv,
2, 14, 22, 24 (1987); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD,
REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 8, 18
(1990).
113 BREYER, supra note 104, at 24-27.
114 Id. at 26 (citing EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT 12 (1992)).
115 See John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, REGULATION Nov. 1986, at 25, 27.
116 See Underground Construction, 54 Fed. Reg. 23,824 (1989); Airplane Cabin Fire Protection, 50
Fed. Reg. 12,726 (1985); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard: Occupant Crash Protection, 49 Fed.
Reg. 28,962 (1984); Safety Standard Requiring Oxygen Depletion Safety Shutoff Systems (ODS) for
Unvented Gas-Fired Space Heaters, 45 Fed. Reg. 61,880 (1980).
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cost effective. At both ends of this spectrum, it was striking to see the
number of heroic assumptions and breathtaking leaps that went into both
the numerators and the denominators of the cost/benefit ratios. Predicting
(and all these numbers were predictions of what a regulation would do, not
confirmations of what it actually did)"'8 both the costs of complying with
the rules and the number of lives they would save involved the constant,
cumulative use of subjective judgments. The regulatory impact statements
included numerous caveats, qualifiers, and broad ranges. By the time this
soup of guesstimates made its way into the 1986 article that was the ulti-
mate source of the four-page table in Breaking the Vicious Circle, its trans-
parency had vanished and it had solidified into a stack of precise-looking
data points." 9 This whole exercise of scouring away all the ambiguities in
search of a single number resembles Bishop Ussher's calculation, based on
the Bible, that the Lord began the creation on October 23, 4004 B.C.
120
This lengthy table on which Justice Breyer places much reliance did
not even attempt to quantify the risks caused by CERCLA sites. Hard data
on these risks are extremely difficult to come by. The National Research
Council of the National Academy of Science performed an exhaustive re-
view of the evidence in 1991 and concluded that there are insufficient data
to determine whether or not hazardous waste sites, on a nationwide basis,
pose a serious threat to the public health.'
21
By contrast, Revesz and Stewart cite two careful examinations of the
known health risks at CERCLA sites. 22 One was prepared by Katherine D.
Walker, March Sadowitz, and John D. Graham of the Harvard Center for
Risk Analysis based on a nationwide survey of Records of Decisions
(RODs), the documents in which EPA stated the reasons for selecting par-
117 See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations-Synthetic Organic Chemicals and Inorganic
Chemicals, 56 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1991); Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314
(1988); Land Disposal Restrictions for First Third Scheduled Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 31,138 (1988); Oc-
cupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,168 (1987).
118 It appears that the costs of complying with health and environmental regulations are often lower
than the estimates of such costs before promulgation. See Adam M. Finkel, A Return to Alchemy,
ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 15, 18.
119 Other prominent scholars have taken to reprinting this chart from Justice Breyer's book, adding
to its stature as authoritative. See, eg., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 134-35,
275 (1997).
120 See Judith A. Villarreal, God and Darwin in the Classroom: The Creation/Evolution Controver-
sey, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 335, 363 n.213 (1988).
121 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EPIDEMIOLOGY: PUBLIC HEALTH AND
HAZARDOUS WASTES 1, 19 (1991); see also Birth Defects Other Disorders Linked to Superfund Site
Exposure, ATSDR Says, 30 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 429A (1996) (report on forthcoming study showing
measurable correlation); cf. Dimitrios Trichopoulos et al., What Causes Cancer?, 275 SCI. AM., 80, 85
(1996) ("Proximity to hazardous-waste sites or contaminated wells may have health effects, but it has
not been shown to impart a measurable excess risk for cancer. It is not certain whether the lack of asso-
ciation is genuine or a reflection of the limited capacity of statistical methods to document a very weak
correlation.").
122 ANALYZING SUPERFUND, supra note 50, at 15-53, 55-81.
Demons and Angels in Hazardous Waste Regulation
ticular remedies at CERCLA sites. 3 The other was written by James T.
Hamilton and W. Kip Viscusi of Duke University; they analyzed a large
group of EPA's human health risk assessments for CERCLA sites.
124
The Harvard and Duke studies both rely on EPA's controversial meth-
ods of risk analysis. With that large caveat, 12 however, they present a seri-
ous empirical challenge to one of Justice Breyer's key factual premises and
to many of the recent political attacks on CERCLA. The Harvard study
concludes that the maximum cancer risk at many CERCLA sites exceeded
EPA guidelines of acceptability by several orders of magnitude, 2 6 and that,
far from being too stringent, selected cleanup remedies would not be
changed much even if the risk assessments were made significantly less
conservative. z7 The Duke study reaches similar conclusions,128 though, as
discussed below, it also highlights that most of the risks were to future, pos-
sibly fictitious residents.
The credibility of professional judgments, such as those underlying
EPA's comparative risk studies, is cast into further doubt by surveys
showing considerable differences in the views of comparably trained scien-
tists who work for industry and those who work for government, 29 and by
numerous examples of expert judgments about technological risk proven
wrong by actual events.
130
I can personally report that some of my most enjoyable times as a trial
lawyer have come while cross-examining risk assessors; few witnesses are
as vulnerable to attacks on the quality of their data and the number and
boldness of their assumptions, which tend to be uncannily congruent with
the outcomes desired by their clients. A total of about fifty steps have been
counted in the conduct of a risk assessment; each is full of uncertainty and
susceptible to challenge.131 When it is all added up, the range of uncertainty
is so great that it is like not knowing whether you have enough money to
123 See Katherine D. Walker et al., Confronting Superfund Mythology: The Case of Risk Assessment
and Management, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND, supra note 50, at 25.
124 James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Magnitude and Policy Implications of Health Risks
from Hazardous Waste Sites, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND, supra note 50, at 55.
125 For one industry critique of the EPA's risk analysis methods, see HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP
PROJECT, EXAGGERATING RISK: How EPA'S RISK ASSESSMENTS DISTORT THE FACTS AT SUPERFUND
SITES THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES (1993). An opposite perspective is found in ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH NETWORK AND NATIONAL TOXICS CAMPAIGN FUND, INCONCLUSIVE BY DESIGN: WASTE,
FRAUD AND ABUSE IN FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH (1992).
126 ANALYZING SUPERFUND, supra note 50, at 30-3 1.
127 Id. at 32.
128 Id. at 79.
129 HIRD, supra note 11, at 52.
130 See Robert B. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment,
1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103, 134-35 (stating that the Three Mile Island disaster revealed the typical over-
confidence of experts).
131 See Mary L. Lyndon, Risk Assessment, Risk Communication and Legitimacy: An Introduction to
the Symposium, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 289,291 (1989).
92:706 (1998)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
buy a cup of coffee or enough to pay off the national debt.1 32 In the words
of the philosopher Isaac Levi, after a disquisition upon a 1975 study of re-
actor safety that was proven wildly wrong by the Three Mile Island incident
of 1979,
Scientists and technologists should not pretend to a knowledge they do not
have because a government or a public demands that they be supplied with an-
swers to questions for which there is insufficient evidence. And the public and
government should understand and respect the limits on what they can expect
of responsible scientists and engineers.
3. The philosophical critique.-Justice Breyer is very much a member
of the classical utilitarian school-the belief in "the greatest good for the
greatest number." Some variant of this view is an important feature of the
law and economics movement that is dominant in most leading U.S. law
schools today. 3 4 Indeed, as an academic, Justice Breyer was a major pro-
ponent of economic analysis of regulatory programs135 and was a frequent
co-author with Richard Stewart, another prominent figure in this field.116 In
their book, Revesz and Stewart point to the existence of competing philoso-
phies:
If the objective [of CERCLA] were to maximize social welfare, [CERCLA's
opponents'] criticisms would certainly be well taken. However, a well-
established tradition in many environmental regulatory programs holds that
132 See C. Richard Cothem et al., Estimating Risk to Human Health, 20 ENVTL. Sci. & TECH. 111,
115 (1986). For a sampling of strong critiques of the scientific validity of risk assessment and of the
technique's use in administrative and judicial proceedings, see Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad
Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89 (1988); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science
Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1613 (1995);.
133 See ISAAC LEVI, THE ENTERPRISE OF KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY ON KNOWLEDGE, CREDAL
PROBABILITY, AND CHANCE 444 (1980); cf. William R. Freudenburg, Risky Thinking: Irrational Fears
About Risk and Society, 545 ANNALS 44, 45-46 (1996) (arguing that proposals for risk-based decision-
making "are based more on the aspirations than on the attributes of risk analysis, which in fact is still a
relatively young, underdeveloped specialty"). Similarly, Brian Wynne, a sociologist of science, has
written of
the need to regulate as ifthe uncertainties involved were narrowly limited and thus credibly man-
ageable within unidimensional, quantitative boundaries. Risk analysis as a technical activity is ex-
pected to reconcile this fundamental contradiction in a way that is credible and authoritative to a
wide array of different actors and institutions, with their own experiences, interests, and percep-
tions of the issues. Unfortunately, science as a regulatory ally tends naturally toward the negation
of uncertainty and diversity, and lends itself easily to bureaucratized forms, which artificially con-
vert genuine ignorance, ambiguity, and indeterminacy into apparently controllable risks or mar-
ginal uncertainties.
WYNNE, supra note 28, at 349-50.
134 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 226,234 (1993).
135 STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
136 E.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW AND REGULATORY
POLICY (3d ed. 1992).
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standards should be set at the level necessary to protect public health without
considering costs, so that every person should be guaranteed some minimum
level of environmental protection.137
In one of the leading critiques of comparative risk analysis, Daniel T.
Homstein has defined a "hard version" that precisely defines Justice
Breyer's apparent outlook as
a blend of three views: first, that sound environmental policymaking is mostly
an analytic, rather than political, enterprise; second, that environmental risk,
measured in terms of expected losses (for example, expected deaths and inju-
ries), is largely the best way for the policy analyst to conceptualize environ-
mental problems; and, third, that different risks, once reduced to a common
metric, are sufficiently fungible as to be compared, traded off, or otherwise ag-
gregated by analysts wishing to produce the best environmental policy.
138
A head-on attack on such utilitarianism is a major feature of Regulat-
ing Toxic Substances: A Philosophy of Science and the Law by Carl F. Cra-
nor, a philosophy professor at the University of California, Riverside. He
shows his disdain by declaring that economists "often subscribe to a nor-
mative moral theory for the allocation of resources that most philosophers
find problematic, the philosophy of utilitarianism. 1 39 Cranor goes on to ar-
gue that the "foundation of the efficiency argument is so controversial that
most philosophers and some economists reject it as an unacceptable theory
for distributing benefits and burdens in a community.'
1 40
Cranor then questions one of the fundamental ideas underlying com-
parative risk assessment---"that the loss of life from one cause is just as im-
portant as loss of life from another cause. A variation of it is that risk of
loss of life from one cause is just as important as a numerically identical
risk of loss of life from another cause. Both are controversial and I would
137 See ANALYZING SUPERFUND, supra note 50, at 16.
138 Daniel T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative
Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 585 (1992). Similarly, another commentator has drawn a dis-
tinction between a "thin" description of risk (which considers just two variables-magnitude of injury
and probability of occurrence) and a "thick" description (which additionally considers such factors as
whether the risk is voluntary or involuntary; whether its potential and actual effects are evenly or un-
evenly shared; whether the risk relates to familiar or unfamiliar activity; whether the benefits from the
risks are shared by those who bear the risks; and whether the risk can be eliminated, as opposed to
merely being reduced). See Christopher H. Schroeder, Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the De-
velopment of Federal Environmental Criminal Law, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251 (1993). Under this
formulation, Justice Breyer has "thinly" defined risk.
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argue indefensible on moral grounds., 141 He proceeds with his argument as
follows:
[I]t is one thing to die in a natural disaster, such as ... an earthquake, and quite
another to be a victim of a murder or of a reckless or negligent release of a
toxic substance. In each case the victim is dead. However, human agency and
human fault makes a difference in our judgments of the issues.... [I]s saving
lives from natural causes morally as important as preventing human beings
from inflicting preventable harms on one another, everything else being equal?
The former rests on a principle of beneficence concerned with the prevention
of suffering, whereas the latter rests on one or another principle of justice. Jus-
tice principles are concerned with distributing benefits and burdens (distribu-
tive justice), with correcting wrongfully inflicted harms and wrongful gains at
the expense of others (corrective justice), or with punishing wrongdoers and
preventing humans from harming one another (retributive justice). Which is
appropriate in the circumstances... [is] controversial, contrary to the presup-
positions relied upon for the normative claims in support of the science-
intensive approach.
142
Cranor also observes a central claim of the environmental justice
movement:
[Toxic substances often] provid[e] minor benefits to many but potentially se-
vere costs to a few [which] appear[s] to be nicely permitted by utilitarian
views. It may be no accident that such views have been prominent in argu-
ments in the environmental health area. If this is right, we also need a para-
digm shift in how we think about the morality of environmental health
protections: we should have much more distributionally sensitive views.
143
While Justice Breyer gives examples only of overregulation, Cranor
believes that the toxics field is plagued by underregulation. Breyer ac-
knowledges in passing the scientific uncertainties in measuring risk,' 44 but
Cranor discusses them at great length, asserting that
false positives, overregulation, and overcompensation of plaintiffs impose
costs on manufacturers of the substance, on their shareholders, and on the con-
sumers of their products. We may be deprived of useful products or pay higher
prices for them. False negatives, underregulation, and undercompensation of
plaintiffs impose costs on the victims or on those put at risk from the toxicity
of the substance.
145
141 Id. at 127.
142 Id. at 127-28.
143 Id. at 177.
144 BREYER, supra note 104, at 28.
145 CRANOR, supra note 139, at 8.
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When in doubt, Cranor would favor overregulation. This is partly out
of considerations of justice,146 and partly because of calculations that seem
to show that regulatory false positives cost society much less than regula-
tory false negatives.
147
Justice Breyer's approach is almost one-dimensional; all factors would
be folded into the risk/benefit calculus, and if they cannot be, they might be
disregarded as irrational. In the words of another advocate of this approach:
Without denying the weaknesses of current risk methodologies, the ar-
gument in favor of using risk analysis in decision-making is simple: there is no
other metric available that allows policy choices to be made coherently....
Ultimately, to paraphrase Winston Churchill on democracy, risk-based envi-
ronmental decision-making may be the worst system ever invented except for
all the others.
148
Cranor rejects the need for a single metric and would have other fac-
tors, beyond any aspirations of quantification, help guide decisions. Clay-
ton Gillette and James Krier have enunciated a similar view-that risk
management is not simply a technical determination, but "an ethical and
political one that technical experts have neither the knowledge nor the
authority to dictate, because the issue transcends technocratic expertise.' 49
146 Id. at 157.
147 This assumption has a somewhat shaky foundation. Professor Cranor states that "[e]conomists
commonly assume that regulatory false negatives cost $10,000,000 and regulatory false positives
$1,000,000." Id. at 125. Reviewing the four studies he cites in support of that proposition shows they
were all written by the same economist (and various co-authors from other disciplines), and that this
economist provides absolutely no support for his assumption about these costs. ) See Lester B. Lave et
al., A Model for Selecting Short-Term Tests of Carcinogenicity, 2 J. AM. C. OF TOxICOLOGY 125, 126
(1983); Lester B. Lave et al., Information Value of the Rodent Bioassay, 336 NATURE 631, 632 (1988);
Lester B. Lave & Gilbert S. Omenn, Cost-Effectiveness of Short-Term Tests for Carcinogenicity, 324
NATURE 29, 29 (1986). Lester B. Lave & Gilbert S. Omenn, Screening Toxic Chemicals: How Accurate
Must Tests Be?, 7 J. AM. C. TOXICOLOGY 565, 567 (1988). To be fair, Professor Lave acknowledges
that these numbers are merely illustrative, and Professor Cranor takes the assumed ratio of false nega-
tives costing ten times as much as false positives and then experiments with different ratios to see the
sensitivity of his conclusions to this assumption.
148 Esty, supra note 111, at 612. As this commentator has stated elsewhere, however,
Being in favor of risk-based decision making need not imply support for 'hard' cost benefit
analysis and mindless adding up of numbers. There are a variety of softer forms of risk-based
analysis that imply some degree of quantification, the use of ranges where numbers are uncertain,
and a recognition that, although inevitably limited, to the extent that quantification is possible, it
narrows the band of uncertainty in which political judgments must be made.
Letter from Daniel C. Esty to Michael Gerrard (Feb. 11, 1997) (on file with the author).
149 Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027,
1085 (1990); see Holly Stallworth, The Use of Economics in Environmental Decision-Making, 7 NEw
SOLUTIONS 8 (1996). For an argument from the middle ground-that quantitative risk assessment is
valuable, but the intrinsically political nature of decisionmaking in this area requires consideration of
qualitative factors-see K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK AND RATIONALITY: PHILOSPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS (1991).
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Hornstein has also embraced Cranor's outlook by arguing that "[t]he con-
sistency toward which [comparative risk assessment] strives is achieved
only by truncating the structure and dimensions of underlying problems,"
and that it "gives an undeserved assurance of scientific legitimacy to the in-
escapably collective (and political) process of establishing social policies
and priorities on environmental problems. 150
The newspapers provide daily evidence that saving lives is not the
only, and often not even the dominant, factor in public and private deci-
sionmaking: Congress increases the national speed limit from fifty-five to
sixty-five miles per hour; soldiers are sent into harm's way to fulfill politi-
cal objectives; government divers venture into tangled wreckages recover-
ing bodies from airplanes that fell into the sea; vacationers risk their lives
by climbing Mount Everest. If lives saved were the only metric, none of
this would happen.151 The image of economic man simply fails to account
for human behavior. Mary Douglas argues that,
Warm-blooded, passionate, inherently social beings though we think we are,
humans are presented in this context as hedonic calculators calmly seeking to
pursue private interests. We are said to be risk-aversive, but, alas, so ineffi-
cient in handling information that we are unintentional risk-takers; basically,
we are fools.... I do not doubt that danger is with us, and very real, but for
heaven's sake, how could we have survived on this planet if our thinking is so
inherently flawed?
152
I now turn to other authors who reject the rational analysis model that
is exemplified by Justice Breyer, but who, unlike Cranor, do so out of a tra-
dition that focuses on community determination of how to deal with toxic
hazards.
D. Damning the Demons: The Community Determination Model
Justice Breyer believes in centralized federal decisionmaking. Robert
Bullard advocates the opposite--community-based decisions:
[Grass roots leaders] are demanding a shared role in the decision-making proc-
esses that affect their communities. They want participatory democracy to
work for them. They are challenging the background assumptions that drive
risk-based decision making, industrial policies that pit jobs against the envi-
ronment, and housing policies that force families to choose between childhood
150 Hornstein, supra note 138, at 587, 630.
151 For a formal analysis of how quantitative risk is only one factor in the decision to undertake a
dangerous activity (the rescue of trapped coal miners), see WYNNE, supra note 28, at 376-79 (arguing
that in addition to risk, factors such as emotions are often weighed and that the decision of whether to
attempt a rescue involves the ex ante anticipation of ex post guilt that results when one decides not to
attempt a rescue).
152 DOUGLAS, supra note 26, at 13-14.
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lead poisoning and homelessness. All of these policies have a disparate impact,
whether intended or unintended, on the quality of life in low-income areas and
communities of color.
153
This school of thought embraces the notion of the evil polluter (though
typically not in precisely those terms) and rejects both the accuracy of
quantitative risk analysis 54 and its legitimacy:
The question of environmental justice is not anchored in a scientific debate but
rests on an ethical analysis of environmental decision-making.... [T]he as-
signment of "acceptable" risk, use of averages, and siting of risky technologies
(i.e., incinerators, landfills, chemical plants, smelters, etc.) often result from
value judgments that serve to legitimate the imposition of inequitable social
policies.I
The environmental justice movement asserts that polluters should pay
for the complete cleanup of contaminated sites, regardless of the cost. For
example, the movement's "manifesto," the Principles of Environmental
Justice, declares "that all past and current producers be held strictly ac-
countable to the people for detoxification. 1 6 Its principal demand in the
CERCLA reauthorization debates has been a greater community role in
cleanup decisions. It shares the universal frustration over the slow pace of
cleanups, but has not focused on the specifics of speeding up the pace.
This movement is also very process-oriented. Though it finds its own
ways to set priorities among risks, it is deeply suspicious of quantitative risk
assessment because of doubts that the methodologies take adequate account
of vulnerable populations, because of fears that most risk analysts are in the
pay of the polluters, and because of concerns that minority communities
will be excluded from risk-based decisionmaking because they lack the
Ph.Ds and airplane tickets necessary to participate in the relevant meetings.
It rejects utilitarianism's single-minded focus on outcomes to the exclusion
of process. In the words of one academic advocate:
Environmental justice is not just about distributional equity; it is also about
procedural equity. When it comes to issues involving the protection of public
153 Chavis, supra note 14, at xvii; see also MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CLOSE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 135 (1995) ("At the heart of the
grassroots movement-and what to this day distinguishes it from the mainstream movement-is its strong
belief in the right of citizens to participate in environmental decision maling.").
154 See UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 13, at 18-19.
155 Id. at 11.
156 Principles of Environmental Justice, reprinted in Anthony D. Taibi, Environmental Justice,
Structural Economic Theory, and Community Economic Empowerment, 9 ST. JOHN'S 3. LEG.
COMMENT. 491, 493-94 n.6 (1994). These principles were first adopted at the First National People of
Color Environmental Leadership Summit in Washington, D.C. in October 1991.
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health and the environment, all persons and groups should have "the right to
participate as equal partners at every level of decision making... ." When we
ask certain members of society to bear the costs for benefits enjoyed by others,
it is critical to ensure a fair process to those bearing the greatest costs.15
7
The empirical and philosophical critiques of risk redistribution by a
centralized elite come together with the vision of community determina-
tion.5 8 As Gillette and Krier have written:
Because risk presents intractable problems and tradeoffs, those placed at risk
should have a role in deciding which games are worth what candles ...
[P]articipation in the management of risk can reduce the sense of helplessness
that arises from involuntary exposure to hazards.... The idea behind partici-
pation, then, is not necessarily to improve the technical accuracy of risk deci-
sions, but rather to enhance the legitimacy of the decision making process....
[G]iven that accuracy could actually be served by a public presence-because
responsible risk assessment and management, however conceived, must de-
pend to some degree on what the public knows, and prefers-public participa-
tion seems only the more appropriate.
15 9
In contrast, Justice Breyer's assignment of a central role to an elite
corps "seem[] designed to protect regulators from capture by Congress and
the public. Yet, by insulating regulators from scrutiny by Congress and the
public, the bureaucratic reforms Breyer proposes may make regulators more
vulnerable to capture by the industries they are supposed to regulate."'
160
Community determination of a very different sort from that envisioned
by Bullard is the plea of John A. Hird, a political scientist at the University
of Massachusetts at Amherst, in Superfund: The Political Economy of Envi-
ronmental Risk. He incorporates elements of writers at both ends of the
spectrum discussed here. Like Breyer, Hird is acutely aware that there is
limited money in the world and that choices must be made among compet-
ing priorities. He also believes that risk assessment, for all its flaws, "is the
best method currently available to systematically evaluate relative health
157 Kuehn, supra note 130, at 129-30 (quoting Principles of Environmental Justice, supra note 156).
See also Brian D. Israel, Note, An Environmental Justice Critique of Risk Assessment, 3 N.Y.U. ENVI.
L.J. 469 (1995).
158 Regulation of toxics is far from the first example of a battle between centralized and grass-roots
decisionmaking in environmental matters. The conservationists led by Theodore Roosevelt advocated
central control by federal experts over resources such as lands, forests and waters, so that their economic
utility could be maximized; the users of these resources (ranchers, farmers, hunters, etc.) demanded local
control. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 271-76 (1959). These battles between Washington and re-
source users (especially in the West) continue today.
159 Gillette & Krier, supra note 149, at 1104-05.
160 Robert A. Pollak, Government Risk Regulation, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 25,
33(1996).
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and environmental risks.' 161 Like Bullard, Hird believes that choices are
best made at the local rather than the national level:
The health and environmental impacts of Superfund sites are mostly local or
intrastate. Past improper dumping of hazardous wastes benefited millions of
Americans in the form of lower product prices and increased shareholder re-
turns, while the costs were concentrated in those communities where improper
dumping occurred. The appropriate response should attempt to reverse the past
distribution of benefits and costs: cleanup costs should be bome federally,
while cleanup benefits should be recognized as essentially local.
162
Hird aims "to bypass the 'public versus experts' problem, and in so
doing, force communities to face the opportunity costs of expenditures to
remediate Superfund sites and force risk experts to see that there is more to
risk management than comparing the number of expected cancers
avoided., 16' To do this, he would divide CERCLA cleanups between those
sites contaminated prior to the enactment of the statute in 1980, and those
contaminated since. Cleanup of the latter would continue to be the respon-
sibility of PRPs. For the former, Hird would create a National Environ-
mental Restoration Fund (NERF), financed either from general revenues or
from a tax focused on the chemical, petroleum, and insurance companies.
The level of NERF funding would be equal to the cost of remediating cur-
rent pre-CERCLA National Priorities List sites (plus any newly discovered
old sites). Each state would then receive that portion of NERF necessary to
remediate the pre-CERCLA sites within its borders.16
In addition, each state, under Hird's regime, would be required to es-
tablish a committee of citizen representatives, with scientific, EPA, and
other advisors, to decide how the NERF would be allocated within the state
(subject to federal approval). These committees would have the benefit of
EPA risk assessments, but would be free to consider other factors as well.
"NERF monies could be used for Superfund cleanups, asbestos removal,
radon or lead remediation, and any other remedial environmental restoration
project.' 65  Hird goes into considerable detail on how all this would
work.
166
The Hird proposal offers several advantages over the current CERCLA
system and other competing proposals. It provides a method that could ac-
tually reallocate funds from less- to more-important health risks. Most
other proposals are very effective at taking money from lesser problems but
161 HIRD, supra note 11, at 58.
162 Id. at 224-25.
163 Id. at 11.
t6 See id. at 233.
165 Id. at 233.
'66 See id. at 232-53.
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are not so good at putting that money back into greater problems. Hird's
proposal also would allow decisions on these trade-offs to be made at the
local level, where people are most affected, rather than in Washington. By
ending most pre-CERCLA liability, it would reduce transaction costs and
the unfairness of penalizing people for the lawful conduct of their predeces-
sors.
The Hird proposal also has its problems. Since NERF would inevita-
bly amount to a large portion of all federal aid for environmental remedia-
tion, creating a local entitlement for such funds calculated on the basis of a
locality's NPL sites may not amount to a fair distribution.167 For example,
New York City would have great use for lead and asbestos abatement
money, but there are no NPL sites there,168 so it would receive no money at
all as part of this program. On the other hand, there are several small towns
in upstate New York with very low populations (and very modest needs for
lead and asbestos money) but large Superfund sites. Hird would have allo-
cation decisions made by states rather than municipalities. This would
theoretically allow for intra-state redistributions, but anyone who is familiar
with New York State politics would not expect an easy path for the transfer
of funds from an upstate Superfund cleanup to New York City lead and as-
bestos abatement. Similar scenarios would presumably occur in many other
states.
Persuading Congress to raise general or specific taxes to fund NERF
would be politically difficult, but it could well be that particular industries
would willingly pay the taxes in exchange for predictability of payments,
liability caps, and reduced transaction costs. In fact, in 1994 large segments
of the insurance industry agreed to a Superfund program financed by sur-
charges on premiums in exchange for a mechanism to resolve many insur-
ance claims at CERCLA sites. 69 As Hird acknowledges, his proposal also
creates difficulties in dealing with payments already made by PRPs for pre-
CERCLA sites, and in preserving incentives for the voluntary cleanup of
such sites.1 70 Finally, Hird would allow the relaxation of cleanup standards
so that, depending on anticipated future land uses, some contamination
could be left in the ground. This takes us out of the realm of the demons of
Superfund and brings us to the angels.
167 Another example of a federal program with a similar basis for allocating federal money with lo-
cal determination of uses is the interstate trade-in program of the Federal-Aid Highway Act. Under this
program, states and cities could decide to "trade in" designated interstate highways and instead use the
funds for smaller highways and mass transit projects. See 23 U.S.C. § 103(e)(4) (1994); see also Block
v. United States Dep't of Transp., 822 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (generally construing § 103(e)(4)). For
a discussion of the beneficial effects of the local determination allowed by this provision, see David Lu-
beroff, Westway's Hidden Lessons, GOVERNING, Sept. 1996, at 76.
168 See National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,510 (EPA
1996).
169 PROBST ET AL., supra note 102, at 27-28.
170 HIRD, supra note 11, at 244-45.
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IL. THE ANGELS OF SUPERFUND AND THE ALTAR OF THE FUTURE
The angels of Superfund are the unborn consumers of drinking water
near contaminated sites, the future breathers of toxic air, the coming dec-
ades' players in the dirt. I argue in the next subpart that the books under re-
view demonstrate that it is the image of these people that drives much of the
current Superfund program, with mixed results.
A. How We Sacrifice the Present for the Future
Except for "removal actions" (removal of leaking drums and the like),
most Superfund expenditures do little or nothing to benefit people who are
alive today. The Harvard and Duke studies in the Revesz and Stewart col-
lection demonstrate, through careful analysis of hundreds of EPA actions,
that the overwhelming preponderance of risks addressed, and money spent,
in the Superfund program are for future generations, especially people who
might live in places where no one resides today, and who might rely on un-
derground water supplies that are not now used. Only a small fraction of
the risks, and costs, pertain to current exposure of people to chemicals.
171
Most of the billions of dollars being spent on Superfund are for some cur-
rently unknowable but probably very small fraction of our distant descen-
dants. This emphasis may be another artifact of the origins of CERCLA:
The entire program is founded on the paradigm of Love Canal: a school is
unwittingly built on an ancient buried hazardous waste site. This searing gene-
sis has translated into a Superfund cleanup process where every site must be
remediated as if it will soon be a playground for toddlers and a residential area
used for drinking water.
172
For strong evolutionary reasons, throughout the animal kingdom there
are no instincts stronger than those linked to perpetuation of the species-
protection of the nest that harbors the young; the sex drive that leads to mat-
ing and reproduction. Some of the most contentious issues on today's hu-
man society relate to the arrival, nature, and perpetuation of future
generations-abortion, nuclear disarmament, racial intermarriage, and ge-
netic engineering are but a few examples. One can question the rationality
of some of these debates, but not the depth of feelings involved. It is hon-
orable and almost religiously prestigious to display regard for future gen-
171 See James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Magnitude and Policy Implications of Health
Risks from Hazardous Waste Sites, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND, supra note 50, at 55; Katherine D.
Walker et al., Confronting Superfund Mythology: The Case of Risk Assessment and Management, in
ANALYZING SUPERFUND, supra note 50, at 15, 25; see also Shreekant Gupta et al., Do Benefits and
Costs Matter in Environmental Regulation? An Analysis of EPA Decisions under Superfund, in
ANALYZING SUPERFUND, supra note 50, at 83.
172 Alex S. Karlin, How Long is Clean? The Temporal Dimension to Protecting Human Health Un-
derSuperfund, NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T, Sept. 1994, at 6,48.
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erations. Thus the administration of CERCLA in a way that protects the
unborn sounds unassailable.
However, the effects of this protection in the Superfund context de-
serve a closer look. Today's high Superfund expenditures to benefit tomor-
row's hypothetical pollution receptors have several adverse effects on
current generations, beyond the obvious depletion of funds that might oth-
erwise go to other purposes. These current effects include:
- The desire for certainty and permanence in cleanup delays the se-
lection and hence the implementation of cleanup remedies, thus prolonging
current exposures. The most serious risks to people currently exposed can
often be addressed through removal actions, but this does not always oc-
cur.
173
-EPA is sometimes so reluctant to tolerate any future risk that it in-
sists on retaining into the indefinite future the ability to sue parties that have
cleaned up sites. This, in turn, can dissuade parties who demand peace of
mind from embarking upon cleanup at all. 174
-The most permanent remedies often involve excavating large
quantities of contaminated dirt and hauling it to distant landfills or incin-
erators.175 The excavation and hauling are known to lead to significant
numbers of injuries and deaths through truck collisions and other accidents.
These current mishaps create risks that are often orders of magnitude
greater than the future risks thereby reduced.
76
-Incineration is often a favored form of treatment because it is
permanent. Its health risks are to current neighbors of the incinerators, as
opposed to future neighbors of the contaminated sites. Incinerators also get
a boost from the CERCLA liability scheme, because their customers face a
far lower risk of liability than do users of hazardous waste landfills in case
the facilities become Superfund sites.
-In several instances, EPA insists on a cleanup that is more strin-
gent than local residents desire, typically because it is perceived to create
unduly high current risks through the use of on-site incineration. 7 The re-
173 See CHURCH & NAKAMURA, supra note 11, at 5.
174 See William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination Cleanup Approvals,
Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80 MINN. L. REv. 35, 45-54 (1995).
175 See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 7, at 13, 43.
176 See Michael B. Gerrard & Deborah Goldberg, Fatalities in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, N.Y.
L.J.., Sept. 22, 1995, at 3.
177 Examples of communities resisting EPA remedial plans they see as locally hazardous or exces-
sive include New Bedford, Massachusetts, see Andrew G. Wright, New Bedford's Plan B, ENGINEERING
NEws-RECORD, Oct. 14, 1996 at 49; Pollution Remedy is Hotly Debated, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1993, at
28; Metamora, Michigan, see Keith Schneider, Superfund at 13: A White Knight Tarnished, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 1993 at 7; Aspen, Colorado, see Jeremy Bernstein, Report From Aspen, THE NEW YORKER,
Nov. 25, 1991, at 121; Granite City, fllinois, see Charging Soil-Lead Removal Ineffective: Granite City
Asks Federal Court, EPA to Halt Residential Lead Cleanup, SUPERFUND REP. 17, July 24, 1996; and
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suit has frequently been pitched legal battles between EPA and localities, in
which EPA attempts to Five precedence to national risk perceptions and
priorities over local ones. 78 These battles highlight CERCLA's uniqueness
among major federal environmental statutes in giving little decisionmaking
authority to the states.179 The urge for total cleanup reflects what Breyer
calls the problem of "the last 10 percent"--the disproportionately high cost
of achieving the last nth degree of cleanliness, even if only "to protect non-
existent dirt-eating children" of the future, where the marginal benefit is
greatly outweighed by the marginal cost. 80 This may also reflect what one
British observer has called the "cultural style" in the United States "to go
hard for idealized regulatory solutions, such as 'zero landfill' and even
'zero waste production,"' leading to "extreme outcomes of localized prog-
ress toward such strict ideals, but interspersed with a widespread lack of
control.'
181
-CERCLA allows EPA and private parties to recover from PRPs
eligible "response costs"--the costs of investigating and cleaning up con-
tamination. However, it does not provide for recovery by site neighbors or
others of personal injuries, property damage, or other toxic tort claims.
18 2
At sites lacking PRPs with cavernous pockets, the funds of PRPs are often
completely depleted in paying for the gold-plated cleanup, with nothing left
over for toxic tort plaintiffs."
_Whether or not there are very wealthy PRPs at a site, smaller
PRPs may be assigned such a large liability that they are driven into bank-
ruptcy.184 This can eliminate jobs and thus devastate the families that relied
upon the income from these jobs. This, in turn, can have adverse health ef-
fects in the form of poorer diet, more heart attacks, and more suicides.
8 s
Burlington, Vermont, see Gayle Hanson, Superfund Supermess: Loaded for Bear, EPA Hits Worms In-
stead, INSIGHT, May 3, 1993, at 7.
178 A former EPA administrator has advocated allowing local risk-taking preferences to play a ma-
jor role in risk management decisions. See William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk; Science, and Democracy, I
ISSUES Sc. & TECH. 19 (1985).
179 See David L. Markell, The Federal Superfund Program: Proposals for Strengthening the Fed-
eral/State Relationship, 18 WM. & MARY J. OF ENVTL. L. 1 (1993).
1SO See BREYER, supra note 104, at 12; see also United States v. Ottati & Goss, 900 F.2d 429, 444
(Ist Cir. 1990) (Breyer, J.).
181 See WYNNE, supra note 28, at 417.
182 See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 375 (1986) (observing that Congress did not intend
CERCLA to compensate third parties for damage resulting from hazardous substance discharge); Arte-
sian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle Co., 851 F.2d 643, 650 (3d Cir. 1988) ("By eliminating
economic loss to victim, and emphasizing cleanup costs, Congress tried to limit liability-at least until
further experience might lead to appropriate modification of the Act.").
183 See MAZMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 7, at 45.
184 See HIRD, supra note 11, at 121.
1tS See BREYER, supra note 104, at 23; see also International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d
1310, 1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J., concurring).
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- Stringent cleanup standards can induce companies to continue to
operate old, substandard, polluting facilities, because when they are closed
they must be cleaned up at a cost that may far exceed the operating
losses.18 6
As Hird points out, there is also an important issue of trans-
generational equity involved.187  Many-perhaps most-Superfund sites
were created decades ago. Some go back to industrial operations in the
nineteenth century. 88 The individuals who actually created the pollution
are all dead or, at least, retired. The savings derived from the polluting ac-
tivities may have long since been distributed as profits to shareholders'" or
as lower prices to consumers.190
When a company is forced today to pay for ancient pollution by its
corporate predecessor, the payments will ultimately come from consumers
(in the form of higher prices), shareholders (through lower profits), and
possibly executives and workers (as lower compensation or lost jobs).
Most or all of these individuals will be different from the consumers, share-
holders, and personnel who were around when the pollution occurred. Only
by treating the corporation involved as an immortal but otherwise anthro-
pomorphic wrongdoer can we say that, in such an instance, the "polluter
pays."
It is challenging indeed to find an ethical justification for forcing indi-
viduals (as opposed to society at large) in the 1990s to pay to protect hypo-
thetical people in the 2090s from actions taken lawfully in the 1890s. As
one study concluded under a plausible set of assumptions, the current Su-
perfund liability and tax scheme "leaves a windfall gain to earlier consum-
ers who paid low prices for goods that were produced too cheaply, and
imposes a windfall loss on new shareholders who paid a normal price for
shares of a firm that did not expect the discovery of a Superfund site.''
Waste management is one of the few areas of public policy where so-
ciety today is making significant sacrifices for the future. By the terms of
conventional financial analysis, these sacrifices would be positively irra-
tional. If a human life is considered to be worth $8 million,192 and a ten
percent discount rate is chosen, then the present value of saving a life one-
186 See Toni Mack, Red Tape, Edible Dirt, FORBES, May 8, 1995, at 112.
187 See HIRD, supra note 11, at 120-22.
188 See id. at 121. For examples of these sites, see Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. St. Joe Miner-
als Corp., 90 F.3d 671, 672 (2d Cir. 1996); Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642, 647 (D.D.C.
1996); John Boyd & Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 775 F. Supp. 435,436-37 (D. Mass. 1991).
189 The funds may also have been utilized to lastingly enrich the capital base of the company, in
which case aspects of the analysis here could differ somewhat. The actual disposition ofthe money de-
rived long ago from polluting practices can rarely if ever be determined.
190 See PROBST ET AL., supra note 102, at 66-67 (suggesting that most savings led to lower con-
sumer prices rather than higher profits).
191 Id. at 67.
192 See CRANOR, supra note 139, at 125; see also HiRD, supra note 11, at 66.
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hundred years from now is only $581.193 If the average cost of saving a life
through CERCLA actions is $5 million,194 and (as shown in the Revesz and
Stewart book) most of these lives are in the future, under this approach the
costs exceed the benefits by four orders of magnitude.
Neither I nor anyone else uses this kind of argument to attack
CERCLA,195 because protection of future generations is not merely a matter
for accountants. The Constitution was adopted in part to "secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,"196 and several envi-
ronmental statutes speak of protection of future generations.197 More fun-
damentally, deep strands in American thought, largely flowing out of the
wilderness experience, hold that preservation of the environment for all
time has worth beyond, and without respect to, any economic calculus.
These strands follow different lines, including transcendentalists like Henry
David Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson who saw personal renewal in
nature; preservationists like John Muir and Aldo Leopold who believed that
nature has its own value, irrespective of people; and theologians who see an
obligation for humankind to act as stewards of God's creation.198 Ordinary
people from every walk of life cite concern for future generations as a cen-
tral reason to protect the environment. 199 Many see a partial cleanup as the
equivalent of leaving contamination in Mother Nature's bosom, and can
draw upon the long history of moral outrage at the depredation of nature.200
93 See generally Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount
Rates, Later Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993) (analyzing the discount-
ing of human lives and other regulatory costs and benefits); see also BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN,
DISCOUNTING HUMAN LIVES: URANIUM AND GLOBAL EQUITY (1994).
194 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, COMING CLEAN: SUPERFUND PROBLEMS CAN
BE SOLVED 25-26 (1989). This figure is probably very low, but it is the only one that could be found for
this purpose.
195 However, see Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1991) (striking
down an EPA regulation under TSCA partly because it discounted the future costs but not the live-
saving benefits); WILFRED BECKERMAN, THROUGH GREEN-COLORED GLASSES: ENVIRONMENTALISM
RECONSIDERED 177-95 (1996) (arguing that discount rate analysis should be applied to all environ-
mental regulations that purport to aid future generations).
196 U.S. CONST. preamble.
9' See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1994); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7651(a)(5)(1994); Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10,131(a)(7) (1994). CERCLA
states a preference for "permanent" remedies, 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1), and protection of future public
health, id. § 9601(24).
398 See RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (rev. ed. 1973); JOHN
PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE: ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AND WESTERN TRADITIONS
(1974); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(1988); see also Jeffrey Spear, Note, Remedy Selection Under CERCLA and Our Responsibilities to
Future Generations, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 117 (1993).
199 See WILLETT KEMPTON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES IN AMERICAN CULTURE 95-102
(1995).
200 See, eg., Geoffrey Wandesford-Smith, Moral Outrage and the Progress of Environmental Pol-
icy: What Do We Tell the Next Generation About How to Care for the Earth?, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY IN THE 1990S, at 325 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990).
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Thus the impulse to protect future generations, and the earth itself, from
hazardous waste has deep spiritual and psychological roots. These feelings
may inhabit a different part of the human psyche than the toxic terrors de-
scribed by Erikson, but they combine and flow together with the image of
the evil polluter to overwhelm any cool economic analysis and to regard it
as the work of fiends in green eyeshades.
B. How We Sacrifice The Future for the Future
When we devote large chunks of today's resources to cleaning up
groundwater for possible future use, we think we are being commendably
long-sighted. However, in some ways we may be doing as much harm for
the future as good. Thus, not only are we sacrificing the present for the fu-
ture, we may also be sacrificing the future for the future.
20V
Fear of CERCLA liability has greatly inhibited the development of
hazardous waste treatment technology. In the absence of satisfactory meth-
ods to destroy such waste, a common remedial method is to excavate it and
haul it away for landfilling elsewhere. When this occurs, the contamination
problem is not being solved--only relocated. In some instances, the waste
has been dug up, moved across the country, dumped in what was later
found to be an inappropriate place, dug up again, and hauled to another
dumpsite, where it created a new contamination problem. °2 Wherever the
remedial waste is left, there remains another problem for future generations,
because landfilling is not so much a form of disposal as it is temporary
containment.
20 3
CERCLA is leaving behind another legacy of contamination as well.
One aspect of the "brownfields" problem noted above is that the fear of
CERCLA liability greatly inhibits redevelopment of contaminated land, and
encourages use of farmland or other relatively pristine acreage. Similarly,
RCRA creates incentives to build new hazardous waste treatment and dis-
posal facilities on virgin rather than contaminated land; otherwise, the new
operator's required groundwater monitoring wells may detect pollution that
could be preexisting from prior site uses.2& Thus clean land is being con-
taminated because of CERCLA and RCRA, and this land may never again
be suitable for residential or agricultural uses.
201 Cf. Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future Generations: A Proposal for a
"Republican " Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 444 (1996) (proposing extension of Breyer's notion
of an elite government agency so that its mandate would also include protecting future generations).
202 MAzMANIAN & MORELL, supra note 7, at 13, 43.
203 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PUB. NO. OTA-ITE-433, COMING CLEAN:
SUPERFUND PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED 140, 217 (1989); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No.
GAO/RCED-92-138, SUPERFUND: PROBLEMS WITH THE COMPLETENESS AND CONSISTENCY OF SITE
CLEANUP PLANS (May 1992); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Pub. No. GAO/RCED-93-188,
SUPERFUND: CLEANUPS NEARING COMPLETION INDICATE FUTURE CHALLENGES 28,49 (Sept. 1993).
204 See 40 C.F.R. § 264.90 (1997).
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The focus on CERCLA also consumes such great resources that not
enough is left for the cleanup of contaminated sites that do not fall within
the Superfund program. When RCRA corrective action sites, Department
of Energy and Department of Defense sites, underground storage tank
cleanups, and other categories are added to Superfund sites, the total
cleanup cost is roughly $750 billion.20 5 This figure dramatically exceeds
the amount that anyone realistically believes society will commit to envi-
ronmental remediation. To the extent that non-CERCLA sites are rarely the
subject of removal-action type remedies to stem the spread of contamina-
tion, future generations will be left to deal with these sites, where condi-
tions continue to worsen if they have spreading groundwater plumes.
Our descendants are also being affected in a different way. In the Nu-
clear Waste Policy Act, Congress has decided that the nation's high-level
radioactive waste-the hottest residue of nuclear power plants and of nu-
clear weapons production-must be permanently buried, sooner rather than
later, in Yucca Mountain, Nevada.2  Creation of this waste, which will
remain highly dangerous for at least ten thousand years, has been one of
mankind's greatest acts of trans-generational hubris. Kai Erikson points out
our primitive state of knowledge about this material, and the decision of
other nuclear nations "to let the wastes cool indefinitely on the surface
(along with the political tempers the wastes always seem to arouse) and, in
that relaxed frame of mind, have scarcely begun the search for permanent
disposal sites. 20 7 He argues:
When one is faced with such high levels of uncertainty, the wisest course
would seem to preserve as much flexibility as possible and to turn to irreversi-
ble measures only if there are no viable alternatives. Deep geological entomb-
ment is clearly one of the least reversible options that can be imagined; indeed,
that has long been regarded as its principal virtue.208
Erikson then concludes with a plea for "forms of storage that allow
both continuous monitoring and retrieval."209 In his view, "We cannot
promise our own children-never mind those who follow hundreds or thou-
sands of years hence-that they will be safe from the wastes. And so long
as that is so, we are not taking the problem out of their hands so much as we
are taking the solution out of their hands."210 Erikson seems to agree with
Thomas Paine, who wrote that "[e]very age and generation must be as free
205 See MILTON RUSSELL ET AL., HAZARDOUS WASTE REMEDIATION: THE TASK AHEAD 16 (1991);
see also BREYER, supra note 104, at 18-19; HIRD, supra note 11, at 7.
206 See 42 U.S.C. § 10,172, 10,172a (1994).
207 ERIKSON, supra note 16, at 204.
208 Id. at 224.
209 Id. at 225.
210 Id.
92:706 (1998)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to act for itself, in all cases, as ages and generation which preceded it. The
vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave is the most ridicu-
lous and insolent of all tyrannies." 21'
IV. ACHIEVING JUSTICE, EFFICIENCY, AND DEMOCRACY IN HAZARDOUS
WASTE REGULATION
The authors of these ten books hold widely disparate philosophies and
have enunciated a broad array of objectives for hazardous waste regulation.
Some attach the highest value to varying kinds of justice and fairness; oth-
ers, to economic efficiency; and others to democracy and participatory deci-
sionmaking.
Can all these urges be reconciled? Can a set of internally consistent
principles be derived that might serve all these interests? Drawing on the
insights from these books, and from my own nearly twenty years of experi-
ence practicing environmental law, I propose a set of principles and use
them to sketch a scheme for a revised CERCLA.
A. Justice
Principle One: Help current victims of toxics.
a. Undertake rapid removal actions to eliminate or reduce current risks
to actual people.
b. Provide tort or administrative remedies so that genuine victims can
receive compensation.
Principle Two: Do not create new victims.
a. Act to halt spreading contaminant plumes that threaten groundwater
supplies.
b. In selecting remedies, take full account of risks involved in the re-
mediation process itself (e.g., to cleanup workers; motorists on roads that
will be traveled by trucks hauling dirt; site neighbors who might be affected
by airborne releases).
c. Do not pollute new sites by simply moving contamination around.
Principle Three: Be color-blind in the siting of new facilities and in
cleanup and enforcement at existing sites.
a. Do not consider race or income in deciding where to site new facili-
ties, in determining the pace or nature of cleanup remedies, or in making
enforcement decisions.
Principle Four: Do not penalize innocent parties.
a. Finance environmental remediation either from general tax revenues
or from sources that bear some nexus to the problem being addressed (e.g.,
actual past polluters or current waste generators).
211 See John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself. The Role of Risk Assessment in
Environmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CINN. L. REV. 1643, 1666 (1995) (quoting Thomas Paine).
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Principle Five: Do not burden future generations.
a. Generate as little waste requiring disposal as possible.
b. Do not unnecessarily contaminate new sites, either with disposal fa-
cilities or with industrial or commercial uses displaced from contaminated
but useable sites.
c. With money from current generators or disposers, create trust funds
for the perpetual monitoring and care of disposal sites.
B. Efficiency
Principle Six: Make effort proportionate to results.
a. Analyze the full costs (both public and private) of all proposed re-
medial actions.
b. Do not insist on extreme cleanup levels unless there is a propor-
tional benefit.
Principle Seven: Do not unduly delay cleanups or make them unneces-
sarily costly.
a. Do not require more studies, verifications, or processes than are rea-
sonably necessary to make sound decisions.
b. Minimize transaction costs by not taking unnecessarily inflexible
negotiating positions.
Principle Eight: Minimize waste creation and new contamination.
a. Consider economic incentives and command and control regulations
to minimize creation of hazardous wastes and to maximize reuse and recy-
cling.
b. So as not to lose the waste minimization benefits of CERCLA, en-
sure that anyone who now generates, transports, or disposes of hazardous
substances will be held fully liable for cleanup of these substances.
c. Enforce RCRA strictly, especially against those entities that are
known to be most prone to violations (such as small businesses in certain
sectors).
d. Devote enforcement resources to the HMTA proportionate to the
current health risk posed by hazardous materials transport.
C. Democracy
Principle Nine: Maximize local determination.
a. Allow local communities to meaningfully participate in decisions
about site cleanups and provide them with technical assistance to enable
them to do so.
b. If local communities believe that greater or more desirable risk re-
duction can be achieved by diverting cleanup funds to other pertinent pur-
poses, consider a mechanism to allow such diversion.
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Principle Ten: Give due regard to psychologicalfactors.
a. Recognize and accept that risk reduction is only one of the factors
that people and society consider in judging appropriate responses to con-
tamination.
The above principles, and the particulars under each of them, are de-
signed to be consistent with each other. Those in most inherent conflict are
probably faster remedy selection and more meaningful public participation.
However, if removal actions are swiftly undertaken to abate current risks,
then delays in selecting the final remedies-actions that are primarily to
benefit future generations anyway-can typically await an adequate process
of citizen involvement.
These principles can be tied together into a new vision of Superfund.
This might start with scrapping the current liability system and using a new
method to finance cleanups. We could, for instance, rely primarily on a tax
on current hazardous waste generators to finance the cleanup of non-federal
sites. This would raise substantial revenues, create economic incentives to
generate less waste, and slash transaction costs. A liability cutoff date (per-
haps 1980 or 1986, the enactment dates of CERCLA and SARA) would be
selected; activities before that date would be a basis for liability only if they
involved violations of the laws or practices of the day, while activities after
that date would lead to strict liability.
EPA would take a nationwide look at all contaminated sites (whatever
program they fall within-CERCLA, RCRA corrective action, state super-
funds, etc.) to identify the greatest current threats to human populations,
and the existing situations (such as spreading plumes) that are causing irre-
versible damage. The first call on the revenues from the new tax would be
abatement (through removal actions or their equivalent) of these most
pressing threats.
Beyond that initial threshold, particularly where the remaining threats
are primarily to future generations, EPA, the state, and the municipality
would all have a role. EPA would apportion the tax revenues among the
states under a formula that would reflect the anticipated full-scale remedia-
tion of all CERCLA and CERCLA-like sites within the state. EPA, the
state, and the municipalities where sites are located would share the deci-
sionmaking (perhaps through a jointly appointed board) in the utilization of
this fund. Where current health threats and spreading plumes have been
abated, a municipality would be given a significant role in deciding the na-
ture of the cleanup remedy, and could apply funds not used in the cleanup
to other risk-reducing activities. The EPA, state and municipal decision-
makers would all have access to the latest risk assessments for the threats
they are considering paying to abate, and they would also be given full dis-
closures as to the likely reliability of these assessments.
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Such a scheme would pay due regard to the above principles of justice,
efficiency, and democracy, which are so often at war in the books reviewed
here. Those who actually create messes would have to pay to clean them
up, while victims would be protected and compensated; resources would be
targeted to the most fruitful activities; and public sentiment would be given
a substantial role. This sketch leaves open a thousand implementation de-
tails, but with the debates over reauthorization of CERCLA and RCRA
continuing in Congress year after year without resolution, now may be the
time to try radically new approaches.
